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ABSTRACT
I conceptualize a theory of deception within the perspective of discourse and pragmatics
while choosing to examine the decision to engage in deception within the perspective of
cognitive psychology. Currently, cognitive perspectives of deception have emphasized
that inhibitory control of one’s motor processes are vital because in order to respond
deceptively, one must prevent honest behavior from leaking into one’s actions. Although
indirect evidence for inhibition is heavily linked with deception, current empirical data
connecting motoric control with deceptive responses has been difficult to observe. I
propose a theoretical perspective that shifts the role of inhibitory control in deception
away from motoric control and into long-term memory knowledge structures. I propose
that deception requires the inhibition of semantic-memory so as to enable the
construction of short-term memory representations that contradict semantic-memory. In
order to examine this question, I constructed sentences that either reflected or violated
world-knowledge (i.e. true or false sentences) and also manipulated the predictability of
these sentences. Participants read these sentences and either responded deceptively or
honestly. The findings suggest that deception suppresses semantic activation that
normally is triggered automatically. The final experiment validated a novel method to
study deception and suggested that the specific nature of a goal underlying the deceptive
behavior is related to this suppression of semantic memory. Future studies are proposed
to explore if the suppression of semantic memory is generalized across all knowledgestructure or is specific to the nature of the deceptive goal.
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INTRODUCTION
Krapohl & Sturm (2002) define deception as “intentionally providing misleading
information.” The emphasis of this definition is on the act of deploying a deceptive
response. Due to the forensic/clinical nature of deception research, the lie-response
portion of deception tends to be emphasized in order to focus on the signal detection
aspects of deception when it does occur (Spence, et al., 2004; Langleben, 2008).
However, this approach is not necessarily compatible with a theory driven approach to
understanding the cognitive processes involved in deception. For this type of approach,
conceptualization of deception within the broader perspectives of discourse and
pragmatics provides a richer theoretical platform from which to frame a testable model.
In its simplest case (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008) two individuals (i.e. two
interlocutors) engage in the social exchange of information, but the liar chooses to not
cooperate with their conversation partner (McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, & Zhu,
2014). In the following paragraphs, I describe some of the more influential theories of
information exchange in conversation, and then describe a theory of deception based on
the subversion of the conversation rules that are normally implicitly followed during
honest behavior.
Information exchange schemas: honesty and deception
The most influential theory related to the conversational rules governing social
exchange of information is the one proposed by Paul Grice (1975). He presented
conversation as being a generally cooperative venture between two or more willing
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participants. This cooperation principle is governed by several implicit rules, known as
Gricean Maxims. He denoted four distinct maxims: Quantity (i.e. only say as much as is
necessary for the listener to understand your point), quality (i.e. only say what you know
to be true, or at least signal when you are unsure about something), relation (i.e. only say
what is relevant to the topic of the conversation), and manner (i.e. say things as clearly as
possible, avoiding intentional obscurity or ambiguity). He summarized these Maxims in
the principle of cooperation, which states
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk-exchange in which you
are engaged.”
Gricean maxims are postulated to direct the ebb and flow of the cooperative social
exchange of information, in which one person requests information and another seeks to
provide it. The type of information that can be requested/provided is dependent on the
specific dynamic of the conversation, varying from simple greetings, personal life stories,
and long-term classroom instruction. Because conversation is dynamic, including two or
more individuals each seeking their own conversational goals, interlocutors must agree to
let the speaker/listener roles naturally shift so as to keep the other person invested in the
conversation (Wilson & Sperber, 1981; Ramos, 1998). Speakers and listeners agree to
maintain an equilibrium of informational exchange, where both interlocutors are allowed
the opportunity to pursue their personal conversational goal. Speakers honestly convey
information relating to their goal and listeners honestly convey information regarding
their degree of receptiveness to that goal. If both interlocutors believe that the equilibrium
is being maintained, then both parties will likely deem the conversation sufficiently
worthwhile instead of choosing to abandon the conversation and do something else.
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Although the informational exchange equilibrium is described above as being an
inherent law of conversation, it is important to remember that it only exists so much as
the interlocutors choose to adapt their behavior in accords to the goals of their
conversation partner. The decision to behave in accords to these maxims requires an
explicit decision to cooperate with a conversation partner. McCornack et al (2014)
recently conceptualized deception as involving an intentional violation of these maxims.
The usefulness of this theory is that it provides predictable outcomes (e.g. violating the
maxim of manner would likely elicit a lie of omission whereas violating the maxim of
quality would elicit a lie of fabrication). The propositions of this theory have already had
tremendous impact on deception research by stimulating further refinements to deception
theory (Walczyk, 2014).
In the spirit of contributing theoretical perspectives to the deception literature, I
propose a theory of deception based on the decision to cooperate with a conversation
partner. I agree that conversations involve the adoption of a certain set of conversational
rules by an interlocutor, and the specifics of these rules direct their behavior throughout
the conversation. The specific rules that govern one’s manner of information exchange
will be referred to as an informational exchange schema. Under an honest schema, the
interlocutor cooperates with their conversational partner, allowing the conversation to
oscillate back and forth between their goals and their partner’s goals in accords to the
equilibrium. However, I propose that under a deceptive schema, the liar adopts a set of
rules that is so radically biased towards their personal goals, that in order to achieve
them, the liar must intentionally disregard or even sabotage their conversational partner’s
goals. From this theory, I define deception as “the intentional subversion of the social
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equilibrium between the information a speaker can potentially share and the information
that is relevant to the listener’s conversational goals.” Within this context, I define a lie as
“the behavior intentionally designed by the speaker to subvert the social equilibrium.”
Thusly, the theory of informational exchange differentiates the decision to deceive from
the actual deployment of a deceptive response.
I argue that an information exchange schema contains the following orthogonal
dimensions: intention to balance shared informational exchange (honesty) vs. intention to
violate shared informational exchange (deception). Within honesty, speakers behave in
accordance to Gricean maxims, allowing the listener’s goals to inform the content of their
messages without any plan to subvert this equilibrium. However, as soon as a context
involves the decision to monitor for message content which, if encountered, would trigger
a deceptive schema, both dimensions of the informational exchange schema are brought
online. Each new solicitation requires the liar to evaluate where the solicitation falls on
these orthogonal dimensions, which determines the liar’s response. This evaluative
monitoring is an additive factor even for those occasions if the liar decides to be honest
(Locker & Pratarelli, 1997). As conversation progresses, liars cooperate only when it is
advantageous to do so (e.g. admitting truthful content the listener already knows,
admitting minor transgressions so as to induce trust, and other behaviors that cohere with
the deceptive-schema’s goals, even if they are not necessarily lies). Therefore, in such a
conversation, the liar is honest only because the solicitation did not match the deceptionsignal, not because they chose to abandon the deceptive-schema.
The primary contributions of this theory of deception are twofold: 1) The
intention to deceive is a stage that precedes the decision to elicit an honest/deceptive
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response and 2) the process of monitoring for the absence/presence of the deceptivesignal (i.e. the reason for the deception) within the environment directs the decision to
elicit an honest/deceptive response. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
processes involved in monitoring for a linguistic deceptive-signal and how such a goal
influences the processes of language comprehension as well as the deployment of
schema-appropriate behavior in response to the comprehended language.
Conscious intentionality predominates deception research
A long held assumption in the field of deception is that conscious intentions are a
necessary part of the deceptive act (Trovillo, 1939; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004;
Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011). Under this assumption, honesty is conceived as
cognitive baseline and deception introduces additional cognitive processes onto this
baseline. This conception proposes that honesty is the process of generating and
deploying a prepotent response whereas deception is the decision to inhibit and replace
this prepotent response. One conclusion used to support the additive demands of
intentionality is that deception is more effortful than honesty, as reported by early
deception researchers examining physiological and cognitive measures (Münsterberg,
1908; Marston, 1920; Burtt, 1921; Goldstein, 1923; Larson, 1923) and modern deception
researchers using cognitive, physiological, and neuroscientific measures (for reviews, see
(Johnson Jr, 2014; Vendemia & Nye, in press).
Initially, deception researchers emphasized the emotional consequences that
followed from the conscious decision to deceive (Jung, 1910), which came to be referred
to as the deceptive attitude (Marston, 1917). Goldstein (1923) described the deceptive
attitude as: “The consciousness of deception appeared as strain, self-consciousness,

5

hesitation, conflict of impulses, emotional disturbances”. In self-reports, the subjective
struggle associated with the intentional act of deception was linked to moral discomfort
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996) or fear of consequences (DePaulo,
et al., 2003). Although emotional sequelae are relevant to deception, I argue that
cognitive processes are more intimately involved, which is why I have chosen to integrate
deception and honesty under the information schema that emphasizes cognitive
mechanisms instead of emotional reactions.
Deception requires the conscious self-monitoring of one’s behavior, which is
cognitively taxing and time consuming (Lane & Wegner, 1995) relative to more rapid
and automatic ways to access knowledge, such as the implicit spreading of activation
across associated concepts in semantic memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins &
Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1977). Current theories of deception posit that liars explicitly
construct a representation of the deceptive-signal (i.e. information that if encountered,
would elicit a deceptive response), and implicitly activated semantic information is
judged in accordance to its relation to that signal (Sporer, 2016; Walczyk, Harris, Duck,
& Mulay, 2014; Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011). Given the explicit self-monitoring
and inhibitory control involved in deception (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008),
and that implicit semantic activation is assumed to be an automatic process (Neely,
1977), deception research has focused on the intentional mental operations conducted on
activated content, not the processes involved in the initial semantic activation in and of
itself (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003; Masip, Blandón-Gitlin, de la Riva,
& Herrero, 2016; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000).
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The informational exchange theory of deception agrees with prior theories of
deception that deceptive-schemas require an extensive amount of explicit decisions:
constructing the deceptive-signal, goal-monitoring to detect the deceptive-signal if
encountered, the decision to generate a deceptive-response following signal-detection,
and finally, the decision to deploy the deceptive response. However, unlike prior theories,
the deceptive-schema is argued to alter the process of evaluating conversational content,
which means that honest-schemas and deceptive-schemas may involve radically different
means of processing stimuli and retrieving memorial content.
In order to examine how memory activation differs across deception and honesty,
this dissertation will examine how honesty and deception evaluate sentences and generate
responses to these sentences, while varying the semantic-relation of the information
within those sentences I will review the deception literature, presenting evidence that
while honest response time (RT) predictably varies in response to experimental
manipulations, deceptive RT is more resilient to such effects. I will present a model that
encapsulates assumptions that are shared across virtually all deception models, referred to
as the Prepotent-Inhibition Model, and review deception research that conflict with these
assumptions. I will then propose an alternative model that could account for these
conflicting findings, referred to as the Binding-Suppression Model. Finally, I will present
original research that supports the predictions of this model.
Resilience and stability of deceptive responses
Resistance to experimental manipulations
The difficulty involved in deceptive responding is evidenced by longer and more
variable response times for deception than for honesty (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004;
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Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005). Although these delayed and variable response
times suggest that deception is more cognitively demanding, paradoxically, deception
research has also reliably shown that honest responses are more responsive to
experimental manipulations than deceptive responses. For example, deceptive responses
are more resilient than honest responses to long-term practice and familiarity with the
task (Vendemia, Buzan, & Green, 2005), suggesting that the difficulty of deception is not
related to inexperience with deceptive responding in an experimental paradigm. Some
evidence suggests that greater experience with deception only reduces the capacity to
respond honestly without influencing deception (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar,
2011). Deception is also less facilitated than honesty by the amount of amount of
preparatory time before a response is required (Ito, et al., 2012), an effect that holds even
when the preparatory cues signal the exact motoric response that should be elicited when
the response-cue is encountered (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005; Vendemia,
Buzan, Green, & Schillaci, 2006). If deception elicited an additive factor on cognitive
processing, the fundamental rules of limited-capacity resources would suggest that
cognitive resources should be more easily overwhelmed under a deceptive schema than
an honest schema (Broadbent, 1977; Posner, 1980; Pashler, 1994).
On the other side of the spectrum of preparation, deception is less influenced than
honesty when participants must decide for themselves whether to be deceptive or honest,
as reported by greater increases in honest RT than deceptive RT, as well as a nullification
of differences between honesty and deception when participants must intentionally decide
(Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; Williams, Bott, Patrick, & Lewis, 2013). In a
prisoner’s dilemma-like paradigm in which participants were instructed to be
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honest/deceptive to a confederate or allowed to decide for themselves to be
deceptive/honest, response time was similar across deception and honesty when
participants decided which schema to adopt (Carrión, Keenan, & Sebanz, 2010). Carrión
et al (2010) also recorded ERPs as participants performed this task, and reported that
instructed-deception, chosen-deception, and chosen-honesty all elicited a larger medialfrontal negativity component (i.e. N450) than instructed-honesty which is a component
considered to index strategic monitoring of cognitive-conflict (West, Bailey, Tiernan,
Boonsuk, & Gilbert, 2012). The primary explanation for this finding is that when
participants are required to decide, the introduction of strategic meta-cognitive decisionmaking can artificially increase the difficulty of honesty without extensively altering the
difficulty of deception because deception inherently requires strategic monitoring
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005; Williams, Bott, Patrick, & Lewis, 2013).
The malleability of honest responses and resilience of deceptive responses to
experimental manipulations is particularly evident in tasks involving rapid stimulusresponse bindings. For example, emotional saliency of stimuli has long been known to
elicit rapid attentional orientation and alter behavioral response time (Mackay, et al.,
2004). However, emotional saliency of stimuli influences honest response times, but not
deceptive response times (Ito, et al., 2011). Similarly, experimental manipulations
designed to interfere with prepared responses tend to increase latency of honest responses
without increasing deceptive responses, as when interference stems from dual-task
paradigms (Hu, Evans, Wu, Lee, & Fu, 2013), distractor stimuli (Duran, Dale, &
McNamara, 2010), or one’s personal beliefs (Johnson, Henkell, Simon, & Zhu, 2008). In
summary, experimental manipulations reliably influence the speed in which honest-
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schemas select and deploy responses, but these effects are either greatly reduced or even
nullified under a deceptive-schema.
Resilience of deceptive responses to individual differences
The resiliency of deceptive response times to variations via experimental
manipulation also appears to extend to research examining individual differences in
cognitive measures. For example, individual differences in executive function reliably
explain variance in honest responses but explain minimal variance in deceptive
responses, as observed with executive-function battery tests which measured inhibition,
shifting, and spatial memory, (Visu-Petra, Miclea, Buş, & Visu-Petra, 2014), and with
verbal short-term memory (STM) capacity (Farrow, Hopwood, Parks, Hunter, & Spence,
2010). Although some variance in deceptive performance has been attributed to
variability in cognitive function (Morgan, LeSage, & Kosslyn, 2009), many studies only
examine difference scores between honest and deceptive responses. Without information
on how honest responses were affected by experimental manipulations, it is difficult to
draw any conclusions about the relationship between cognitive functions and deception.
Resilience of deceptive responses to induced cognitive load
Applied research in the law enforcement field supports the malleability of honest
responses and resiliency of deceptive responses (Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, &
Meek, 2006). Inducing cognitive load consistently improves differentiation of liars from
truth-tellers (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Wainer, Gruvaeus, Blair, & Zill, 1974), but this
must be done carefully so as to only induce cognitive load on liars and not on truth-tellers
(Verschuere, Meijer, & Vrij, 2016). For example, one reported method to induce
cognitive load on liars was to require suspects to convey their alibi in reverse-order,
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because it was assumed innocent suspects could easily reverse their episodic memories,
but guilty suspects would need to recreate the alibi from scratch (Vrij, et al., 2008).
Although the concept initially created much excitement, later research has revealed that
requiring suspects to report an episodic memory in reverse order mostly causes innocent
suspects to appear more deceptive (Fenn, McGuire, Langben, & Blandón-Gitlin, 2015).
Contrarily, deception appears most easily detectable when both the innocent and
the guilty are motivated to feel relaxed and free to state a large amount of information
(Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014), especially if the questions are difficult to expect (Vrij &
Granhag, 2012). However, when the questions are difficult to understand, such as when
law enforcement investigators include complex exclusionary clauses to simple questions,
the increase in comprehension difficulty reduces detectability of deception (Podlesny &
Raskin, 1978). I posit that increasing the cognitive complexity of a task, whether it be the
comprehensibility of a question or introducing additive factors that obstruct responding
(e.g. requiring that an alibi be reported in reverse order), the difficulty associated with an
honest schema is increased to a far greater extent than the difficulty associated with a
deceptive schema. The reason for this is that deception is already difficult to perform and
virtually impossible to prepare for unless the liar can practice an explicit stimulusresponse script (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). The actual content of the question or the
response-modality parameters is not going to differentiate the cognitive-load of a liar
drastically. Contrarily the effort involved in honest behavior is heavily contingent on the
parameters of stimulus-response binding (Donders, 1868). Therefore, by increasing the
difficulty of honesty to a greater extent than the difficulty of deception, the difference in
cognitive effort between honesty and deception is ameliorated.
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In summary, honest schemas are governed by the rules of informational exchange,
meaning that honest responses will vary in accords with the context, such that contexts
that reduce the complexity involved in stimulus-processing  response-selection will
facilitate responding whereas more cognitive complex contexts will delay honest
responding due to the extra cognitive processing required (Sternberg, 1969). Contrarily,
deception operates on a series of rules that are entirely separate from the standard rules of
conversation, therefore, the effort required to elicit a deceptive response does not vary in
a similar manner as an honest response. The informational exchange theory of deception
argues that honesty and deception are subject to entirely different rules of cognitive
complexity, which means it should be possible to increase difficulty of honesty without
altering the difficulty of deception. Both schemas are subject to unique rules that govern
cognitive processes. Methods to detect deception should consider rules of both schemas.
Deception and the inhibition of prepotent responses
One of the primary reasons postulated for the difficulty associated with deception
involves the inhibition of prepotent responses (Spence, et al., 2001; Vendemia, Buzan, &
Simon-Dack, 2005; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003). Inhibition is the active prevention
of one process as a function of another process (MacLeod, 2007). Prepotent responses are
holistic sequences of events which result from ballistic processes (Osman, Kornblum, &
Meyer, 1986) that can be automatically deployed without conscious intention or planning
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Friedman & Miyake, 2004), such as the rapid ocular
orientation to a light (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001) or the recognition of
common words by skilled reader (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Such automatic
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responses do not benefit from practice nor are they impaired by cognitive-load or
autonomic arousal (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).
Taken together, the inhibition of a prepotent response can be defined as the active
prevention of a ballistic process which normally reaches its point of no return without
conscious thought or interference from other processes. Inhibitory control of motor
activity is reported to be vital component of deception (Hadar, Makris, & Yarrow, 2012;
Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010; Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Duran, Dale,
Kello, Street, & Richardson, 2012) and it has a place in virtually every major model of
deception (Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2006; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, &
Mulay, 2014; Sporer, 2016). As depicted in Figure 1.1, these models propose that liars
inhibit the honest response in order to generate and deploy a deceptive response. This
application of inhibitory control is related to the difficulty associated with deception.

Figure 1.1: Prepotent Inhibition Model. In this model, the critical
element is the excitation or inhibition of the prepotent response
following sentence evaluation.
Inhibitory control is a complex construct to measure because it is inherently
defined by the context of the ballistic process that is currently being inhibited. Examples
of inhibitory control include: Inhibition of stimulus-response congruity, in which a
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stimulus which would normally activate a response must be inhibited in order to deploy
another response (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Inhibition of distracting/irrelevant
information, in which participants construct a top-down goal and suppress all stimuli that
are irrelevant to the goal (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Inhibition of
prepared responses, in which someone initiates a response, but subsequently decides that
response is inappropriate and must cancel the response before it is deployed (Osman,
Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986). Although it seems obvious that deception should involve
some form of inhibitory control, research endeavors have generally failed to identify any
link between deception and any specific type of inhibitory control (Caudek, Lorenzino, &
Liperoti, 2017). In tasks comparing honesty and deception, performance on these
inhibitory control tasks explain variance that is either solely associated with honesty or
variance that is shared across both honesty and deception (Debey, Verschuere, &
Crombez, 2012; Debey, De Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki, & Verschuere, 2015). Even
when inhibitory control of planned responses was measured via individual differences,
with stop-signal reaction time, while also experimentally manipulated, with sober vs.
intoxicated participants, neither stop-signal reaction time nor sobriety explained variance
unique to deception, (Suchotzki, Crombez, Debey, Van Oorsouw, & Verschuere, 2015).
If deceptive-schemas inhibit prepotent responses, then deception research should
explore the effects of such inhibition on the responsiveness of prepotent responses.
Different prepotent responses (e.g. pupillary dilation, galvanic skin response, heart rate,
etc.) differ in their response to deceptive schemas (Verschuere, Kindt, Meijer, & Ben‐
Shakhar, 2016). For example, physiological evidence suggests that deceptive schemas
suppress all prepotent motor responses, not just those associated with honesty
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(Pennebaker & Chew, 1986). When a mechanism is inhibited, it becomes less responsive
to stimuli which would normally activate it (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). If
deception inhibits mechanisms that are normally involved in behavioral responding, then
perhaps their suppression is related to the cognitive demands of deception. Imagine
hanging a picture on the wall while refusing to use a hammer. It is still possible, but
lacking such an appropriate tool increases the difficulty. Similarly, if deceptive-schemas
suppress a wide range of cognitive mechanisms that are available under an honestschema, then those mechanisms will be less responsive to stimuli under deceptiveschemas. Deception’s reliance on slower cognitive operations relative to honesty results
in the paradoxical finding that deceptive responses are: 1) Longer and more variable than
honest responses and b) more stable across experimental contexts than honest responses.
Deception and the inhibition of semantic memory
Liars actively inhibit implicit semantic associations from directing response
generation in order to construct responses that may not cohere with semantic and episodic
memory (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Meek, Phillips,
Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013). By suppressing the role of semantic activation on
response-generation, liars must rely on conscious evaluative processes to generate
responses that contradict semantic memory and sufficiently accomplish their
conversational goals (Frith & Frith, 2008). From this perspective, honesty and deception
might differ in processing time because honesty involves cognitive resources that operate
on a faster timescale than the cognitive resources involved during deception, such as the
decision to allow exogenous cues to direct attentional search as opposed to constantly
requiring goal-based vetting of generated-responses (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012).
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The conscious decision to deploy a response that directly contradicts semantic
memory may underlie the subjective conflict as well as the processing costs associated
with deception. Constant self-regulation rapidly depletes cognitive resources (Vohs &
Heatherton, 2000) and can be detrimental to one’s emotional and physical health (Lane &
Wegner, 1995). Such subjective conflict will not be resolved via verbal working memory
capacity or inhibitory control. Perhaps the resiliency of deception to experimental
manipulation is due to the proactive inhibition of implicit processes. If implicit processes
are no longer allowed to direct responding under a deceptive schema, then not only will
deceptive responses become inherently delayed, but also, any effects that would elicit
differential degrees of implicit responding will become nullified due to the utter lack of
involvement from implicit processes.
The concept that deception inhibits semantic memory from informing motor
responses is not unfounded in the literature (Gardner, 1937; Runkel, 1936; Morgan &
Ojemann, 1942; Münsterberg, 1908). Luria (1932) likened deception to the destruction of
organized behavior, whereby the liar prevents automatic associations from informing
motor output and then selectively replaces undesirable honest responses with deceptive
ones. The conscious awareness and suppression of unexpressed responses has been
argued to delay behavioral responding relative to when stimulus-response programs are
informed by rapid semantic associations (Morgan & Ojemann, 1942; Vrij, 1997). When
Farrow et al. (2010) observed that verbal working memory only benefited honest
responses, they argued that honest responses benefited from rapid memory retrieval
because each memory-trace did not require conscious evaluation if semantic associations
were sufficiently strong but every deceptive response required conscious evaluation
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regardless of memory-trace strength. In fact, this effect was so profound that high verbal
working memory increased the detectability of deception because as verbal working
memory increased, honest responses became faster and deceptive responses remained the
same, resulting in larger differences between honest and deceptive responses. The
inaccessibility of implicit associations to inform deception delayed responses until such
time as conscious evaluative processes can determine the appropriateness of a response.
Therefore, deception detection was facilitated by speeding honest responses instead of
influencing deceptive responses.
The field of psychophysiological detection of deception also supports the reduced
accessibility to memory-traces when under a deceptive schema. For example, the P3b
ERP waveform, itself a neural signature of memory updating (Polich, 2007), is
suppressed in deception relative to honesty (Vendemia, Buzan, Green, & Schillaci, 2006;
Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009; Stelmack, Houlihan, & Doucent,
1994; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; 2004; Johnson, Henkell, Simon, & Zhu, 2008).
Most intriguingly, when a memory-trace contains misinformation, and thus is relatively
less cogent, honest-schemas elicit a suppressed P3b whereas deceptive-schemas
consistently suppress P3b regardless of memory cogency (Meek, Phillips, Boswell, &
Vendemia, 2013). Further evidence that deception alters memory activation is that under
honest-schemas, stimuli that are similar to remembered items, but do not match (e.g.
when two playing cards share a number, but differ in suit) elicit larger P3b amplitudes
than stimuli that are very different from remembered items (e.g. when one playing card is
a number and the other is a face card), whereas under deceptive-schemas, all mismatch
stimuli elicit similar P3b components regardless of similarity to the remembered item
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(Marchand, Inglis-Assaff, & Lefebvre, 2013). It appears that the potential for activation
gradients within semantic memory, which have long been reported to be an automatic
component of semantic memory (Neely, 1977; Heyman, Hutchison, & Storms, 2016),
may be proactively suppressed following the activation of a deceptive-schema.
Further ERP deception research has examined the N400, a component associated
with automatic memory retrieval processes (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Kutas &
Federmeier, 2011). The examination of this component in deception has revealed that the
N400 is enhanced (i.e. more negative going) in deception relative to honesty, suggesting
that deception restricts access to memory (Meek, Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013;
Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009; Stelmack, Houlihan, & Doucent,
1994; Tu, et al., 2009; Proverbio, Vanutelli, & Adorni, 2013). Although the N400-effect
has been reported when comparing deceptive responses to semantically-relevant vs.
semantically-irrelevant information (Ganis & Schendan, 2013), few studies have
counterbalanced semantic-relation and information schema. The majority of N400 studies
on information schema have examined the relationship between schema and either
sentence truth-value or stimulus-response congruity following a response-cue (Meek,
Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013). There has been minimal work comparing
deception and honesty during the process of sentence evaluation and then examining the
N400 on words varying in semantic-relation to the constructed context. One goal of the
present research is to provide the deception literature with the materials to examine
sentence evaluation during honesty and deception in such a way that sentence-evaluation
is orthogonal to sentence truth-value and stimulus-response conflict.
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Deception: inhibition of motor responses or semantic memory?
Individuals who are prepared to deceive activate a response inhibition process
prior to the evaluation of incoming information, even if they eventually opt to be honest.
In order to respond honestly, this inhibitory process must be decoupled, which incurs a
cognitive-cost for the otherwise honest response. Figure 1.2 shows that responding
honestly with a different response than the prepared one required similar time as either
deceptive response, but deceptive responses were relatively similar regardless of response
interference (Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005).
By choosing to monitor for a deceptive-signal which, liars may activate inhibition
in a proactive manner, in order ensure all incoming information is evaluated. Even if
someone chooses to respond honestly, the time it takes to decouple the inhibitory process
may nullify any memorial benefits of implicit semantic activation (see Figure 1.2)

Figure 1.2: Congruent and Incongruent RTs when participants
were not cued until Stimulus 2. Adapted with permission from
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005)
Prior research has proposed that the role of response inhibition is additive to the honest
prepotent response. In such a model, referred to as the Prepotent Inhibition Model (see
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Figure 1.1), semantic associations are similarly accessible under honesty and deception,
but deception engages inhibitory control predominantly on motoric processes. Semantic
associations transcend spatial and temporal boundaries, allowing for distinct memory
episodes to be consolidated together if their features are sufficiently similar (Tse, et al.,
2007; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Tulving, 1972). This consolidation enables past
experiences to implicitly inform current behavior without explicit memory retrieval of
individual episodic events. Although survival is often facilitated by generalizing prior
experiences to the current environment (Seligman, 1970), deception usually requires a
response that will not generalize outside the immediate context because it contains
information that is simply not true.
I propose that inhibitory control operates within semantic associations, such that
the automatic spreading of activation between associated concepts in semantic memory is
suppressed, hereafter referred to as the Binding-Suppression Model (see Figure 1.3). The
Binding-Suppression Model proposes that in order to engage in a deceptive act, one must
choose to suppress semantically-associated concepts as those associations are based in
one’s understanding of world-knowledge, and deception requires the liar to generate
information that overtly contradicts that knowledge. Under a deceptive schema, the truth
interferes with implicit spreading of activation across semantic memory is suppressed,
which enables the liar to consciously integrate information that would otherwise elicit
interference from semantic-memory.
If deception inhibits semantic memory, much about the literature becomes clear.
Deceptive responses are less subject to experimental manipulations or individual
differences than honesty because those experimental variables are more relevant to
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automatic semantic associations than conscious evaluations. If deception inhibits those
associations, then variation in semantic associations will predict variation in honest

Figure 1.3: Binding-Suppression Model. In this model, the critical
element is the involvement or suppression of implicit semantic
associations. If these are suppressed by deception or impoverished
stimuli, then conscious memory search and retrieval is required in
responses, but not in deceptive responses. This also explains why deceptive responses
have a much higher “floor” of response latency than honesty. Honest responses can be
rapidly deployed if sufficient information is rapidly attained, but this does not apply for
deceptive responses. Without the involvement of rapid semantic associations, deceptive
responses must be generated via slower systems accessible to conscious evaluation.
When deception is viewed from the cognitive perspective provided by the
Binding-Suppression Model, the historical research emphasizing the emotional
consequences of the deceptive attitude deserve to be reinterpreted. In his initial work on
reaction time of deceptive responses, Marston (1920) describes a state of deceptionspecific response delays as follows:
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The witness, unable to concentrate because of the inevitable physiological
expressions of his fear, becomes more and more introspectively aware of the fear content
itself, and proceeds to exert great effort to suppress this fear….such increased effort only
tends to bring intellectual and motor processes into consciousness in addition to the fear
content already present. – pg 79
Marston’s argument is that a liar’s awareness of potential consequences elicits emotional
reactions which prevent the generation of thoughts unrelated to the emotion, which then
only increase the emotional consequences which only further prevents the generation of
other thoughts. When the cognitive framework underlying binding-suppression is
considered, Marston’s observation can be reinterpreted without changing his observation.
My interpretation is that the decision to activate a deceptive schema triggers
binding-suppression, which suspends the implicit generation of novel thoughts. Although
an emotional experience can be elicited via awareness of potential consequences, the
emotional experience itself does not impair one’s ability to generate novel thoughts.
Instead, I propose that binding-suppression is always active when one decides to lie,
regardless of the emotional consequences. I do agree that under situations that elicit
potential consequences, the introspective awareness of binding-suppression, as described
by Marston (1920), can propel the intensity of these emotional experiences. But these two
concepts, binding-suppression and the deceptive attitude, are distinct components
underlying the deceptive-schema.
Deception and the complexity of response-selection
As the literature currently exists, the only consistent experimental manipulation
that alters latencies of deceptive responses is the complexity involved in selecting and
deploying an appropriate response. Psychological research has long observed that as
number of viable responses increases, time required to select and deploy a particular
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response also increases (Donders, 1868), and this finding appears to extend to the
complexity involved in determining a deceptive response. For example, lying about a fact
is easier than lying about a held belief, as measured by response latency (Ofen, WhitfieldGabrieli, Chai, Schwarzlose, & Gabrieli, 2017) and speech-errors (Vru & Heaven, 1999).
Similarly, open-ended questions (e.g. describe what happened) induce deception specific
difficulty relative to simple yes/no questions (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey,
2003) and are effective in differentiating deceptive responses from honest responses
(Oxburgh, Myklebust, & Grant, 2010), presumably because open-ended questions
provide liars less explicit direction in generating responses.
The hypothesis that deception becomes more difficult as number of available
responses are increased has been quantitatively examined in Williams, Bott, Patrick, &
Lewis (2013). These researchers presented participants with either two-choice
alternatives or three-choice alternatives meaning that, liars presented with two-choice
alternatives merely had to select the single incorrect response whereas liars presented
with three-choice alternatives had to determine which of the two incorrect responses
should be selected. Contrarily, honest responding only changed in the degree of visual
search needed to locate the honest response choice, so the difference in difficulty across
honesty and deception was unique to deception. This increase in response alternatives
increased latency of deceptive responses without influencing honest responses. These
researchers also found that preemptively invalidating one of the response alternatives in
three-choice alternatives reduced the deception specific difficulty. On the other side of
this spectrum, the sole exception to the finding of delayed responding in deception is that
deceptive responses can be speeded if an explicit stimulus-response script can be learned
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and practiced (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), providing further proof that response-complexity
is a primary source of deception-related response variability. These findings bolster the
argument that the process of constructing and selecting the lie response is an additive
factor unique to the deception. The process of examining deception and honesty should
consider the fact that there is greater response-ambiguity in deception relative to honesty.
Summary of literature review of deception research
I hypothesized that deception involves an inhibitory mechanism which is active at
the semantic level, such that semantic associations which implicitly generalize across
concepts are suppressed, requiring the liar to rely on slower conscious evaluations that do
not vary as a result of stimulus-based features (e.g. semantic-relatedness). I conducted
three experiments to test the Binding-Suppression Model by manipulating the
accessibility of semantic memory traces during response generation. If deception inhibits
prepotent responses by suppressing bindings between easily accessible memory traces
and stimulus-response bindings, then the degree of truth prepotency should not influence
deceptive RT, but truth prepotency should influence honest RT.
Psycholinguistic manipulations and the accessibility of semantic memory
Although honest responses are assumed to be prepotent, that doesn’t necessarily
mean that honest responses are simple to generate and deploy. In order to respond
honestly, participants understand task-rules, process environmental stimuli, determine the
appropriate response, and then deploy the response. Effects in each of these processing
stages will sum into response, which can easily lead to erroneous conclusions about a
mental process (Sternberg, 1969). For example, the Wason Selection Task, in which
participants must comprehend rules and then generate potential hypotheses to test them,
has long been used to study executive-function and higher order reasoning (Wason, 1968;
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Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995). However, modern evidence suggests that many of these
reported effects reflect simpler issues related to text processing instead of higher order
reasoning (Almor & Sloman, 2000). Psychological research requires extensive
experimental control in order to isolate an intended psychological construct (Osgood,
1953), so the notion that honesty is a simple process should not be taken for granted
One factor that is necessary for honesty and deception is sentence-evaluation
because comprehending someone’s intended message is vital for conversation. In this
dissertation, sentence-evaluation involves comparing the meaning of a sentence against
world knowledge (i.e. is it true or false). Psycholinguistic evidence reveals that
determining truth-value is complex (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975;
Wason, 1959; Singer, 2013) but there are certain patterns in terms of how the
relationships between words influence the complexity of sentence-evaluation (Collins &
Quillian, 1969; Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg,
1994). Below, I define and describe some of the relations relevant for this dissertation.
Lexical information, word-based linguistic information, constrains the
relationships between words within a sentence (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg,
1994). Lexical relationships are generally divided into two forms of information:
semantic and syntactic. Semantic relationships are defined as those that exist between the
meanings of words within the sentence whereas syntactic relationships are defined as the
functional relationships between words within the sentence. Semantic relationships are
generally accessed automatically, even under states of high cognitive load whereas
syntactic relationships require more effortful processing and are less accessible under
states of high cognitive load (Friederici, Rueschemeyer, Hahne, & Fiebach, 2003).
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During sentence-evaluation, semantic-memory activates knowledge structures,
and sentence-evaluation enables people to determine the degree to which that sentence is
true by comparing it to what is known about the world. Overall, world-knowledge refers
to information that is heavily entrenched, which means that certain beliefs are contingent
on world-knowledge being accurate (Shipley, 1993). The more entrenched a concept is
within knowledge structure, the more easily it is comprehended and the more resistant it
is to change or even damage (Langacker, 1987). Therefore, sentences that are true are
evaluated as such because they cohere with deeply entrenched concepts within LTM to a
greater degree than false sentences. Therefore, over the course of their lifetime,
participants have had a greater frequency of exposure to true concepts than false
concepts. Through the process of sentence-evaluation, people compare the sentence to
world, and mismatches elicit a false evaluation (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson,
2004).
The process of integrating words into a holistic unit is incremental, whereby each
word adjusts the meaning that the sentence could convey (Morris, 1994; Altmann &
Kamide, 1999; Matsuki, et al., 2011; Isberner & Richter, 2013). By incrementally
integrating linguistic input into a holistic unit, information that is incongruent with the
context is rapidly suppressed, enabling one to integrate only relevant information into the
preceding context (Fischler & Bloom, 1979; Stanovich & West, 1979; Swinney, 1979;
Neely, 1977). This suppression process is informed by how constraining the context is
with respect to what is congruent. As the probability of an individual word in a context
(i.e. cloze-probability) becomes increasingly high, the effort required to comprehend and
integrate that word into the sentence is reduced (Payne & Federmeier, 2017).
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Relevance of psycholinguistic research to deception research
Liars must comprehend the meaning of stimuli which prompt deceptive responses
(e.g. questions) and subsequently generate a lie that is uniquely appropriate for that
particular stimulus. Because language comprehension is often a necessary preceding
component of deception generation, I posit that deception research can be conducted with
greater precision if linguistic features of stimuli are experimentally manipulated.
Deception and honesty may elicit distinct processing patterns during evaluation of
sentence truth-value, and if so, uncontrolled variation in sentence complexity may
obscure, or even alter, effects related to deception or honesty. Manipulating the lexical
relationships relevant to sentence evaluation will enable me to observe deception and
honesty across different linguistic environments. If certain lexical manipulations
influence honesty, but not deception (or vice-versa), the distinct cognitive processes that
underlie deception and honesty will be better understood. I argue that the findings from
psycholinguistic literature can inform the use of linguistic stimuli in experimental designs
for deception research by manipulating the degree of involvement required by automatic
and controlled processes.
The goal of this series of studies is to examine the role of lexical information in
the process of deploying deceptive vs. honest responses. In the present studies, I
manipulated the semantic and syntactic relationships within sentences and examined how
deception/honesty differed in truth-value evaluation as well as subsequent responses to
prompts. By altering statement comprehensibility, I examined the relationship between
the operations which underlie deception and those which underlie semantic memory.
Upon examining the role of lexical relationships in deception and honesty, I examined
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how sentence content and intent-to-deceive interacted when participants needed to
simultaneously determine truth-value and whether or not it was appropriate to be
deceptive or honest.
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DESIGNING TEST ITEMS
Plausibility Item Development
I conducted a series of item-development studies to construct items that balanced
sentence truth-value with the content of the sentence itself.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 16 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina,
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
Items that varied in plausibility were developed to develop a set of items that
would allow me to test if the lexical relationships within a sentence are relevant to the
process of sentence evaluation across different information schemas. These items
consisted of three sentences each, with one true sentence that would contain semantically
related words (true sentences), and two false sentences. One false sentence would contain
semantically related words (implausible sentence), and the other would contain
semantically unrelated words (violation sentences). All sentences were designed to be
grammatically correct and interpretable. These items would allow me to test if
information schema altered the process of evaluating truth-value, as would be observed
by deceptive and honest schemas eliciting different patterns of responding to the false
sentences. The Prepotent Inhibition Model predicted that the implausible sentences will
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benefit from semantic relationships whereas the Binding-Suppression Model predicts that
such semantic facilitation would be suppressed under a deceptive schema.
I adapted sentences from prior research on truth evaluation (Nieuwland, 2015) in
order to create three types of sentences: true, implausible, and violation as shown in
Table 2.1. True sentences (1) referred to semantically-related information in a manner
consistent with world knowledge. Implausible sentences (2) referred to semanticallyrelated information in a manner inconsistent with world knowledge. Violation sentences
(3) referred to semantically-unrelated information.
Table 2.1: Stimuli developed based on plausibility. The pre and post-critical region are
constant, but the object-noun in the critical region was manipulated
Pre-critical region

Object

Subject

Verb

True

Implausible

Violation

Teachers

punish

students

principals

nurses

that are disrupting the class

Cowboys

ride

horses

buffalo

camels

when they go to the ranch

Lifeguards

protect

swimmers

sharks

birds

at the beach

Hunters

shoot

deer

cattle

insects

during the hunting season

Gardeners

plant

flowers

weeds

sand

to make their garden prettier

Weathermen

report

storms

asteroids

murders

that are expected in the next few days

Barbers

cut

hair

wigs

steak

while carrying on a conversation

Plumbers

remove

clogs

weeds

lamps

using special equipment

Architects

design

buildings

tunnels1

sandcastles

with a lot of windows

paper

trees1

using detergent

senators

pets1

who show up late
to make a living

Cleaners
Supervisors

wash
scold

clothes
workers

Post-critical region

Authors

write

books

laws

schedules1

Witnesses

describe

suspects

bystanders1

buildings1

as causing the crime

clients

prisoners2

hermits

at their law firm

news

nothing1

recipes

to inform the public about important issues

Attorneys
Journalists

meet
report

1 Sentences in evaluation of the Post-Critical-Region was required to assess truth-value.
2 Post-experiment analysis suggested the sentence’s truth-value was ambiguous

As depicted in Table 2.1, the sentences contained a pre-critical region containing
a plausible noun-verb combination, the critical region containing the truthful,
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contradictory or implausible information, followed by a post-critical region which
contained contextual information consistent with both pre-critical and critical region
information. A total of 15 items were created, totaling 45 sentences, as can be seen in
Figure 2.1. Participants were divided into two groups. All participants encountered the
true sentences, but half of the participants encountered the contradictory sentences and

Figure 2.1: Experimental Design to develop plausibility items. Honesty and
deception are cued by font-color, with the second prompt containing either the word
True or False. Each sentence was repeated 6 times throughout the experiment, cued
for honesty and deception 3 times each.
the other half encountered the implausible sentences. Each sentence was repeated 6 times
throughout the experiment, resulting in a total of 240 trials.
Procedure
The procedure will be addressed in more detail in the current research section, but
see Figure 2.2 for a visual depiction. Participants arrived in the lab and practiced a penand-paper version of the task before practicing the task on the computer. In order to
proceed to the experiment, each participant had to achieve at least 67% accuracy. For
each trial, participants were presented with a sentence that they evaluated as true or false.
When they were ready to continue, they pressed the spacebar and viewed a fixation point
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for 500 ms (plausibility item development) or 750-1250 ms (all other studies). They were
then presented with a second-prompt, the word True or False. The information schema
for the trial was cued by font color (all studies except Embedded-Cue) or sentence-

Figure 2.2: Directed Deception Task using a Standard Sentence Verification
Task. A sentence is presented on a screen for 2500-3000ms, followed by a
fixation prompt, and then the word “True” or “False”. Participants are cued by
font-color to respond honestly or deceptively, and they do so by indicating their
agreement or disagreement with the second prompt.
content (Embedded-Cue), and participants were instructed to respond in accordance to
the information schema by pressing a key to indicate agreement or disagreement with the
prompt-word.
H1: I expected to replicate previous research showing that honest responses are
faster and more accurate than deceptive responses.
H2: I expected to replicate previous research showing that honest responses are
faster and more accurate when responding to true sentences than to false sentences.
H3: I predicted that deceptive responses would be faster and more accurate when
responding to anomalous sentences than to implausible and violation sentences.
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Results
One participant was removed from the study after data collection, when the post
session interview revealed that English was the participant’s second language, leaving 16
participants for data analysis. I conducted two paired t-tests on RT and error data,
comparing honest and deceptive responses. Participants responded significantly faster
[t(15) = 3.20, p < 0.01] when responding honestly (M = 722 ms, SD = 141 ms) than when
responding deceptively (M= 827 ms, SD = 246 ms), and elicited a significantly greater
proportion of accurate responses [t(15) = 3.68, p < 0.005] when responding honestly (M =
0.95, SD = 0.03) than when responding deceptively (M = 0.90, SD = 0.07).
In order to test the effect of lexical relationships on deceptive and honest
responding, I conducted unpaired t-tests comparing RT data and error data of the
plausibility group (n=9) to the violation group (n=7). I found no significant differences
between conditions for either errors or RTs for either honest or deceptive responses.
Post-hoc analysis
Post-hoc evaluations revealed two confounds in stimuli: 1) Sentence length and 2)
location of truth-value disambiguation within sentence. In order to identify patterns
within the sentences that might lead to better item construction, I performed a principal
components analysis on the RT of every sentence presentation. The analysis explained
72.42% of the variance in RT within the sentences using 15 components. Overall, the
sentences clustered into components according to truth-value, with certain notable
exceptions. Implausible sentences consistently clustered together, but certain true and
violation sentences were either inappropriately grouped or distributed across multiple
factors. An examination of these sentences suggested that unusually strong syntactic
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relationships between words influenced RT more strongly than semantic relationships,
suggesting that certain syntactic effects may have confounded the results.
Conclusions
After evaluating the potential confounds, I realized that plausibility was not the
critical factor underlying the manipulations. The semantic relationships within the words
of the sentences was more important. I opted to redirect my research to differentiate the
role of semantic and syntactic relationships in evaluating truth-value. I also determined
that controlling the sentence region in which truth-value was disambiguated was critical
to developing a psycholinguistically controlled set of items. I decided to design items in
which the region of disambiguation was matched across sentences.
Lexical Violation Item Development
Following the initial assessment of plausibility, I determined that further
refinements were necessary with respect to sentence length, truth-value disambiguation
location, and lexical relationships. Additionally, I wanted to create a list of items that
would mimic deception paradigms, with the exception that the schema-cue would be
embedded into the sentence content itself instead of the color. I determined that one
method would be to develop a set of items that varied in accordance with a simple
categorical judgement, such that the entire item list could be easily separated based on
this categorical judgement. However, this manipulation should not interfere with
sentence-evaluation, and potentially not even be noticed unless the categorical judgement
itself was a top-down goal during sentence-evaluation. The reason for this parameter is
that I wanted the schema-cue to be based entirely within the mind of the participant, such
that participants given schema-based instructions and participants who are naïve to the
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schema-manipulation could read the exact same items, but only the schema-instructed
participants would notice the categorical distribution of the items. Such an outcome is not
possible with the artificial nature of the color schema-cue.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 16 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina,
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
Based on plausibility item development, I made critical changes to reduce the
confounds of sentence-length and truth-value disambiguation. The items were redesigned
to consist of only three words in the grammatical structure of Subject-Verb-Object. The
subject-noun was isolated for the categorical manipulation, such that two lists of items
were created based on the following categories of subject-nouns: Humans and nonhuman animals (e.g. Architects, Beavers). During this process, I generated as many
potential subject-nouns as possible in order to create potential candidates that varied in
their phonological features (e.g. initial phoneme, word length) and semantic features (e.g.
taxonomy: occupations/phylogeny). When one feature was determined to be the highest
ranking feature present in the candidate list, I intentionally attempted to generate
candidates that violated that feature in a way that introduced variety to the candidate list.
The verb was selected such that, when integrated with the subject-noun, the subject-verb
context would be semantically cohesive and elicit specific predictions for subsequent
content (e.g. Architects design, Beavers gnaw).
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The object-noun was manipulated so as to trigger truth-value disambiguation
across four different sentence types (one true and three false). The false sentences were
designed such that the falsity is detected at distinct processing stages (see 1-4).
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

True sentences: Barbers cut hair
Implausible sentences: Barbers cut wigs
Violation sentences: Barbers cut steak
Anomalous sentences: Barbers cut waves

The final list was controlled to also include an equal number of humans and nonhuman animals for the subject-noun. By matching all sentences in accordance to the
preceding context, and only manipulating the object-noun, I could examine the role of
distinct lexical-relationships across information schemas in a more controlled manner. At
this point, the parameters regarding sentence constraint and lexical relationships are
purely subjective and based on the principles within the psycholinguistic literature. The
conclusions obtained from lexical-violation item development informed the type of
objective validations necessary for the current research. The items are available in Error!
Reference source not found..
Implausible sentences contained words that were easily mapped onto pre-existing
knowledge structures whereas the object-nouns in the violations sentences are not stored
in the same knowledge structure as the preceding context. It is known that the
experimental context could alter participants’ internal parameters which define sentence
evaluation (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). I
opted to present the implausible and violation sentences to two separate groups of
participants, but both groups were presented with true and anomalous sentences. The
group that received the implausible sentences are referred to as the plausibility group and
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the group that received violation sentences are referred to as the violation group; see
Figure 2.3. Therefore, the plausibility group would read sentences containing information
that were already associated within long term memory while the violation group would
process information not associated within long term memory. I predicted that stronger
memory traces of the sentences would be encoded in the plausibility group than the
violation group. These memory traces would reduce time required to compare the probe
and sentence and will result in shorter RTs for the plausibility group than the violation
group.

Figure 2.3: Experimental Design for deployment of lexical-violation items. All
participants encountered true sentences containing semantically related words and false
sentence containing semantically unrelated words. One group also received false
sentences containing semantically related words and another group received sentences
whose syntactic constraints did not match the prior context
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the plausibility item development procedure.
H1: I expected to replicate previous research revealing that honest responses are
faster and more accurate than deceptive responses.
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H2: The plausibility-group would elicit faster reading and response times than the
violation-group across all sentences.
H3: Honest responses to true sentences would be faster than all other sentence
types, and honest responses to implausible sentences would be faster than violation and
anomalous sentences, which would not differ from one another.
H4: I hypothesize that, deceptive response times will be faster for violation and
anomalous sentences than for true sentences and implausible sentences.
Results
Data Screening
Two participants were removed from the study after data collection because their
accuracy failed to exceed 80%, leaving 16 participants for data analysis, with eight
participants in each group. Fifteen items were removed because at least one truth-value
condition had less than 67% accuracy, leaving 49 items for data analysis. The first five
trials were removed to correct for familiarity with the paradigm. Data screening totaled
26% of the data. For the RT analysis, I removed all trials with RTs of less than 300 ms,
incorrect response on the current trial, or an incorrect response on the immediately
preceding trial. The removal of these responses totaled 14% of the data.
Analyses
When analyzing RT, there was no effect of Group so it was dropped from the
analysis, and the semantic-false and syntactic-false sentences were collapsed into a single
factor referred to as partial-false sentences. I conducted an ANOVA on schema and truthvalue. There was a significant effect of schema [F(1, 15) = 6.98, p < 0.05] which was
subsumed under an interaction with truth-value [F(2, 30) = 4.39, p < 0.05]. Significantly
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faster response time to true sentences [t(15) = 7.32, p < 0.0001] was observed for honest
responses (M = 684 ms, SE = 39 ms) than for deceptive responses (M = 862 ms, SE = 56
ms). A similar pattern was observed for partial sentences [t(15) = 1.87, p < 0.05], with
honest responses (M = 774 ms, SE = 44 ms) requiring less time than deceptive responses
(M = 865.86, SE = 85.35). No significant differences were observed between honest and
deceptive responses. The tests partially confirmed my hypotheses, such that detectability
of deception decreased as sentences became less comprehensible.
In order to determine why these differences of detectability were observed, I
separated the honesty and deception conditions and conducted pairwise comparisons of
each sentence type within the schema conditions. As seen in Figure 2.4, honest responses
to true sentences (M = 680 ms, SE = 89 ms) were faster (all p-values < 0.005) than both
honest responses to partial sentences (M = 771 ms, SE = 80 ms) and honest responses to
false sentences (M = 752 ms, SE = 84 ms), while honest responses to partial sentences
and false sentences did not differ from each-other. Contrarily, deceptive responses did not
differ across all truth-value conditions (all p-values > 0.10).

Figure 2.4: RT as a function of schema and truth-value
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Although there was no significant effect of group in the omnibus ANOVA, I
tested my hypothesis regarding the effect of group with a one-tailed independent samples
t-test, comparing RT of the implausible group across all sentence-types to the violation
group. The effect was only a nonsignificant trend (t(14) = 1.34, p = 0.10). Given that
statistical learning operates on syntactic parsing processes (Fine, Jaeger, Farmer, & Qian,
2013), I performed a follow-up analysis to test if the groups adapted to the experiment
differently. I conducted a generalized linear model examining the effect of trial and
Group on the RT associated with each sentence type, which is depicted in Figure 2.5.
Trial was nested within truth-value, with group as a between-subjects variable. The
omnibus test was significant [2 (7) = 113.43, p < 0.001, and there was a significant main
effect of Group [2 (1) = 35.36, p < 0.001] and a significant effect of trial × Group ×
truth-value [2 (6) = 60.69, p < 0.001]. The regression model predicted that the semanticgroup responded more quickly than the syntactic-group [β=-230 ms, SE = 9 ms, 2 (1) =
35.36, p < 0.001]. With regards to the effect of trial on the semantic-group, the regression
model predicted that trial reduced RT for the true sentences [β = -24 ms, SE = 1 ms, 2 (1)
= 5.46, p < 0.02].and false sentences [β= -32 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 7.68, p < 0.01], with
no significant effect of trial on partial sentences (P > 0.05). For the syntactic-group, the
regression model predicted that trial reduced RT for the true sentences [β = -75 ms, SE =
1 ms, 2 (1) = 50.34, p < 0.001], false sentences [β = -68 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 30 ms, p
< 0.001, and partial sentences [β = -57 ms, SE = 2 ms, 2 (1) = 22.71, p < 0.001].
The implausible group activated entrenched representation during their
evaluations whereas the violation group activated novel representations during their
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evaluations. Several dozen instances will not provide enough experience to alter
entrenched representations but minimal experience with novel representations can elicit
implicit learning of statistical regularities across these instances, thus facilitating
processing of subsequent instances (Fine, Jaeger, Farmer, & Qian, 2013).

Figure 2.5: RT across trials for participants in semantic and syntactic groups as function
of truth-value
I hypothesized that truth-value would influence honest responses, but not
deceptive responses. To test this, I conducted a one-tailed unpaired t-test to test if the
groups differed in their honest and deceptive responses to partial sentences. There was a
trend in the expected direction, suggesting that the semantic group responded more
quickly [t(15) = 1.61, p = 0.064] when making honest responses to partial sentences (M =
710 ms, SE = 93 ms) than the syntactic-group (M = 833 ms, SE = 151 ms). Also as
expected, deceptive responses to partial sentences did not differ between groups (p >
0.05). A follow-up analysis was conducted on the other truth-value conditions. Because I
lacked apriori hypotheses for group differences across these truth-value conditions, I used
two-tailed t-tests. When responding to true sentences, both groups were similar in their
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honest and deceptive responses (p > 0.05). A trend was discovered for honest responses to
responses to anomalous sentences, such that participants in the implausible group
responded more quickly [t(15) = 1.94, p = 0.07] when making honest responses (M = 687
ms, SE = 93 ms) than those in the violation group (M = 822 ms, SE = 130 ms). Deceptive
responses to anomalous sentences did not significantly differ between groups (p > 0.05).
I hypothesized that honest responses would be more affected by lexical
relationships than deceptive responses. This hypothesis was supported, as honest
responses differed as a function of sentence content and experimental context, whereas
deceptive responses were not affected by these variables.
Post-hoc analyses
I refrained from hypothesizing effects of schema on reading time due to the
absence of available research. I examined reading time in a mixed ANOVA: 2 (Group:
implausibility vs. violation) × 2 (Schema: honesty vs. deception) × 3 (truth-value: true vs.
partial vs. anomalous). There were no significant effects of group in main effects or
interaction, but there were main effects of schema [F(1, 14) = 12.18, p < 0.01] and an
interaction between schema and truth-value [F(2, 28) = 4.07, p < 0.05]. The main effect
of schema showed that honest schemas (M = 2700 ms, SE = 136 ms) elicited significantly
faster reading times [t(1, 14) = 3.01, p < 0.01] than deceptive schemas (M = 3325 ms, SE
= 226 ms). Two-tailed t-tests were conducted to examine truth-value across schemas. For
honest schemas, true sentences were read (M = 2293 ms, SE = 114 ms) significantly
faster [t(15) = 2.10, p < 0.05] than anomalous sentences (M = 2973 ms, SE = 285 ms) and
partial sentences (M = 2835 ms, SE = 250 ms) at a trending significant level [t(1, 15) =
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1.67, p=0.12]. For deceptive schemas, there was no effect of truth-value (all p-values >
0.5). The impact of deceptive schemas can be seen on mean reading time in Figure 2.6

Figure 2.6 Effect of truth-value and cue on reading time.
Reading time is longer when participants are cued to respond
deceptively
Conclusions
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, truth-value only influenced reading times under
honest schemas, with true sentences requiring less time than anomalous sentences
whereas truth-value did not influence reading time deceptive schemas. This finding
replicates the research showing that false sentences require more time than true sentences
(Clark & Chase, 1972), but this finding does not generalize to deceptive schemas. Taken
with plausibility item development, these findings support the Binding-Suppression
Model that sentence content does not alter sentence evaluation time under a deceptive
schema, but sentence content does alter evaluation time under an honest schema.
Deception researchers have reported null-effects when examining difference-scores
between deception and honesty, arguing that certain experimental manipulations can
reduce the difficulty involved in making deceptive responses (Verschuere, Spruyt,
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Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). However, the results of item development suggested that certain
experimental manipulations may not alter difficulty of deceptive responses and instead,
are only altering the difficulty of honest responses. Finally, the need to screen more than
10% of the data suggests that these items need to undergo further revision.
Revising Lexical Violation Items
Methods
Participants
Participants were 17 undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina,
who participants in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
I revised the items from lexical violation item development that failed the
accuracy check, resulting in 64 items, with similar conditions as before. The revised list
is reported in Appendix B.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to plausibility item development.
Hypotheses
I expect to replicate the effect of schema on sentence-evaluation: 1) honestschemas would elicit faster response times to true sentences than false sentences, and 2)
deceptive-schemas would nullify the effect of truth-value.
Results
I analyzed the effect of truth-value and schema on log-transformed RT with a
linear mixed effects regression (LMER), as is recommended to maintain assumptions of
normality (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Subjects and items were coded as random
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effects and the accuracy on preceding trial nested within subject. Truth-value and schema
were coded as fixed effects. The random effect of item did not explain a significant
amount of variance to the model, so it was removed, demonstrating the high consistency
across items. The results of the LMER is reported in Table 2.2 and the raw data is
presented in Figure 2.7. Honest responses to true sentences were faster than honest

Figure 2.7: The effect of truth-value and schema on mean response
time. Results suggest different effects of truth-value across honest
and deceptive schemas.
responses to partial and false sentences, which did not differ from one another. However,
deceptive responses to false sentences were faster than deceptive responses to true and
partial sentences, which did not differ from one another.
My hypothesis was partially supported, such that honest responses to true
sentences were faster than sentences that were evaluated as being false (partial and
anomalous) whereas deceptive responses did not differ between true and partial sentences
even though the type of evaluation differed. The Binding-Suppression model predicts that
sentences which can be rapidly evaluated can subsequently be rapidly responded to (e.g.
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true sentences relative to partial and anomalous sentences) when one is responding
honestly, but not when one is responding deceptively.
Table 2.2: LMER results for effect of truth-value and instruction on RT to probe

All evaluations
B

CI

t

p

(Intercept)

6.58

6.49 – 6.67

129.48

<.001

Instruction (Honesty vs Deception)

0.12

0.09 – 0.14

9.001

<.001

Honesty: Truth-value (True vs. Partial & False)

0.11

0.06 – 0.15

4.613

Honesty: Truth-value (Partial vs False)

0.02

-0.02 – 0.07

1.015

<.001
0.31

Deception: Truth-value (True vs. Partial & False)

-0.15

-0.21 – -0.08

-4.352

<.001

Deception: Truth-value (Partial vs False)

-0.07

-0.14 – -0.00

2.01

0.045

Discussion
Deception was most easily detected for true sentences, and the reason for this
detectability is the ease of honest responses to true sentences relative to false sentences.
Within information schemas, different effects of truth-value were observed. Deceptive
schemas elicited similar responses across true and implausible sentences, which were
more delayed than anomalous sentences (true = implausible > anomalous). Contrarily,
honest responses were faster to true sentences than to both types of false sentences,
implausible and anomalous, which did not differ from one another (true < partial = false).
It appears that information schema alters the influence of truth-value on subsequent
responding, as honesty elicits faster responses to true sentences, but deception elicits
slower responses to true sentences. Additionally, deceptive schemas are differently
influenced by lexical relationships than honest schemas: Implausible and anomalous
clustered under honest schemas whereas implausible and true clustered under deceptive
schemas. The current research project explores the relationship between information
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schema, lexical relationships, and truth-value. To improve precision and interpretability
of this research, I decided to drop the violation condition from further experiments.
Validation of conceptual entrenchment and linguistic expectancy
The item development process revealed it was possible to differentiate the
relationship of schema and semantic-relation within a truth-value. However, there were
two potential confounds in lexical violation items. First, the item design only allowed for
differences in semantic-relation across false sentences, with no manipulated differences
across true sentences. The second confound was that although the sentences were
intended to vary in truth-value within a constrained subject-verb context, this was not
empirically validated.
It is difficult to solve the non-orthogonality of semantic-relation and truth-value
because semantic-relation and truth-value are not necessarily orthogonal features. The
sheer presence of information that is semantically unrelated to a concept heavily reduces
truth-value (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979). Only recently have psycholinguists begun
identifying specific contextual properties that can preclude such false evaluations, such as
including extensive linguistic qualifiers (Nieuwland & Martin, 2012) or presenting the
otherwise unrelated information in a context that is uniquely appropriate (Filik, 2008).
Given that these solutions involve the use of linguistically complex contexts to overrule
semantic-relation effects, I did not consider them appropriate to examine the role of
implicit semantic activation across information schemas. However, the role of context in
influencing the integration difficulty of subsequent content was appropriate within the
paradigm. Although it may be impossible to vary the degree to which a word is
semantically related to a concept without altering truth-value, it is not impossible to vary
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the degree to which the preceding context generates expectations of upcoming words
without altering truth-value.
Linguistic expectancy refers to the coherence between the current meaning
activated by a sentence context and the adjustments that will be necessary in order to
accommodate upcoming lexical content (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). As new words are
encountered, readers integrate them into the preceding context, which is recurrently
revised based on the coherence between context and word (Hale, 2003), and the degree of
required revisions is a major source of cognitive processing (Frank, 2013). If a context
elicits a high expectancy for a particular word, but instead that context is completed with
a highly unexpected word, readers will generally need to revise their expectancies in
order to fit the new word into the context. Comparatively, the highly expected word
would demand minimal revisions, and therefore would be more easily integrated into the
context than the unexpected word (Frank, Otten, Galli, & Vigliocco, 2015; Smith &
Levy, 2013). Items were developed for the Lexical-Expectancy study and Embedded-Cue
study in order to examine the role of linguistic expectancy in sentence evaluation by
manipulating the expectancy of the object-noun within the sentences in a manner that is
orthogonal to the truth-value of that sentence.
Expectancy can be quantified via the cloze-probability test (Bloom & Fischler,
1980). Participants receive a sentence fragment and then provide the word that is most
likely to complete the sentence. The cloze-probability of a word refers to the probability
of that word being selected to complete the sentence. Therefore, the cloze-probability of
an individual word can be conceptualized as the expectancy of that word from the
perspective of that specific sentence context. The process of empirically validating cloze-
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probability and truth-value was conducted using Mechanical Turk (www.MTurk.com),
and validation proceeded in a three-stage sequence: cloze-probability validation of
subject-verb contexts, and truth-value validation of sentences.
Cloze-probability validation
Subject-nouns developed in prior iterations of item development were selected
and novel subject-nouns were generated as needed based on similar parameters (e.g.
Archers, Chickens). I selected an object noun that I wanted the subject-verb context to
elicit (e.g. arrows, eggs). Based on the subject-object relationship, I generated verbs that I
believed would create a subject-verb context that was likely to elicit the object-noun, but
would vary in the number of other object-nouns that could be elicited as well (e.g.
Archers shoot/notch/fire/hold/prepare, Chickens lay/hatch/guard/protect/watch). All
subject-verb contexts were presented to a minimum of 20 raters on Mechanical Turk with
approval ratings that are greater than 95% and resided within the continental United
States. Subject-verb contexts were presented in a random order with the instructions “fill
in the blank with the word you think would best complete the sentence.”
Cleaning of the cloze-probability data proceeded as follows: Misspellings were
corrected (e.g. arrows  arrows), plural and singular nouns were counted as one (e.g.
arrow = arrows), punctuation was removed (e.g. arrows.  arrows), and quantified
phrases were cleaned if they consisted of less than 33% of total responses from that rater
(e.g. lots of arrows  arrows). Semantic and/or taxonomically similar responses were not
cleaned, and instead were counted as two distinct entries (e.g. arrowheads =/= arrows).
Mturk users were removed and replaced if their data was deemed to be corrupted (e.g.
quit rating process before completing), unrelated to task (e.g. 33% of data contained
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words that no other user entered), violated task parameters (33% of data included multiword phrases instead of a single word) or included otherwise inappropriate language (e.g.
profanity). Compensation was given to removed Mturk raters on a case-by-case basis,
depending on how intentional the user appeared to be in providing unusable data.
The goal was to develop contexts that varied in the mathematical mean of clozeprobability, but not in the mathematical mode of cloze-probability. Therefore, cleaned
data was organized based on the subject-noun, and within that category, the verbs were
organized based on the object-noun with the highest cloze-probability value generated
from that context. If a verb elicited an object-noun with greater than 50% clozeprobability, that context was marked as a potential candidate for a high-cloze condition.
Contexts which elicited that object-noun with a lower cloze-probability were marked as
candidates for the low-cloze condition, so long as the highest cloze-probability response
was shared in both contexts. For example, Archers shoot elicited arrows at 90% clozeprobability and although Archers hold elicited arrows at 15% cloze-probability, it also
elicited bows at 65% cloze-probability. Even though these contexts differed in their
elicitation of arrows, it is not appropriate to argue that Archers hold is a low-cloze
context. If the highest cloze-probability ranking was a tie between multiple words, those
verbs were counted as viable candidates for the low-cloze condition of those objectnouns.
Truth-value validation
The cloze-probability validation was intended to create two different clozeprobability contexts for a single object-noun. The subject-verb context was combined
with the highest cloze-probability object-noun obtained from Mturk raters in order to
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create the true condition of the truth-value manipulation. In order to create the false
condition, I selected object-nouns that were thematically similar to the true object-noun
(e.g. arrows  bullets), but were designed to create a sentence that would be evaluated
with a false truth-value.
Sentences were presented to 10 Mechanical Turk Master Raters who specialize in
categorization tasks, with the instructions “Rate each sentence on a scale of 1-2-3-4-5 in
terms of how true you believe the sentence to be, with 1 being completely false, and 5
being completely true”. In order to qualify for truth-value validation, true sentences
required an average truth-value rating between 4-5, and false sentences required an
average truth-value rating between 1-2. Similar rules of data screening governed the
removal of Mturk users as during the cloze-probability validation. If a true sentence
failed the truth-value requirements, the context was sent back to the cloze-probability
validation stage. If a false sentence failed the truth-value requirements, then a different
object-noun was selected and another set of ratings was collected, or the entire context
was sent back to the cloze-probability validation stage in order to create a more effective
context. This cycle continued until I created 40 items with four sentences that passed
these validation requirements.
After creating this list of 40 items that were validated on truth-value and clozeprobability, I validated the verbs and the objects on several basic psycholinguistic
metrics. More specifically, word frequency, age-of-acquisition, syllable length, and letter
length of the verbs and the objects were obtained (Brysbaert & New, 2009; Kuperman,
Stadthagen-Gonzalez, & Brysbaert, 2012) and the manipulations of cloze-probability and
truth-value were tested for differences in these variables using a paired t-test. If a
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condition elicited significant different results, I selected the item with the most extreme
differences, and began the process of revising it and/or creating new items. This process
continued until 40 items were validated in accordance to the cloze-probability and truthvalue parameters as well as the psycholinguistic controls. The average cloze-probability
obtained for these 40 items was as follows: Low-cloze (M=45.62%, SD=14.64%), highcloze (M=83.87%, SD=13.95%). The truth-values for the four sentences was as follows:
low-cloze true (M=4.49, SD=0.31), high-cloze true (M=4.66, SD=0.24), low-cloze false
(M=1.77, SD=0.24), high-cloze false (M=1.65, SD=0.35). Cloze-probability did not have
a significant effect on truth-value (p > 0.10, suggesting that cloze-probability related to
the verb did not influence the truth-value related to the object-noun.
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RESEARCH
I conducted three studies to test the predictions of the Binding-Suppression
Model. The first examined the role of semantic relationships on sentence-evaluation
across honest and deceptive schemas. The second study examined the role of linguistic
expectancy on sentence evaluation across honest and deceptive schemas. Finally, the
third study tested if these findings generalized to an ecologically valid paradigm, where
information schema cues were embedded in a sentence context instead of sentence color.
Hypotheses
In the Semantic-Relatedness, I examined the effect of information schema on
sentence evaluation while varying semantic relationships within sentence contexts. In
Linguistic-Expectancy, I dropped the anomalous condition from the SemanticRelatedness, so there were only two conditions of truth-value, and introduced a verb
manipulation designed to alter the expectancy of object-noun in the true-condition. If
honest and deceptive schemas are similarly informed by implicit processes, then
linguistic expectancy should be similarly informative to sentence evaluation and response
processes across both honest and deceptive schemas. However, if deceptive schemas do
inhibit all implicit processes, then linguistic expectancy should only influence honest
schemas, with no effect on deceptive schemas. In the Semantic-Relatedness and the
linguistic expectancy as well as virtually all other deception studies involving linguistic
materials, the truth-value and schema-cue associated with a trial are placed into different
facets of the sentence (i.e. linguistic and perceptual features respectively). In order to test
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if the processes involved in determining truth-value share a limited-capacity with the
processes involved in determining schema, Embedded-Cue was conducted, in which
truth-value and schema-cue were simultaneously embedded into the sentence. It is
predicted that the process of sentence evaluation and subsequent responding would
deviate from those observed in previous studies because of the limited-capacity of
sentence-evaluation and the additional requirements involved to maintain the schema-cue
in working-memory instead of it being presented externally in the sentence and the probe.
Data analysis approach
This research implemented concepts and methods from several disciplines, all of
which possess unique approaches to data analysis and presentation of results. I chose to
analyze and present the data in a manner that would be meaningful to readers across the
varying domains while still providing the most accurate presentation of the results.
To analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in
the following studies, I conducted a within-subjects analysis of variance (Winer, Brown,
& Michels, 1971) Follow-up analyses were conducted as needed to evaluate significant
interaction effects. Across all studies, the primary dependent variables included reading
time and response time, and a primary independent variable shared across studies is the
schema (honesty vs. deception). Specifically, for Semantic-Relatedness, another
independent variable was truth-value (true vs. implausible vs. anomalous). Specifically,
for Linguistic-Expectancy and Embedded-Cue, independent variables also included truthvalue (true vs. false), and cloze-probability (low vs. high).
Effects sizes for ANOVA factors are ηp2, which is defined as the amount of
variation in the data explained by the factor divided by the sum variation explained by the
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factor and the variation associated with individual variation within the observations (i.e.
Sums of SquaresBetweenGroups / Sums of SquaresBetweenGroups+ Sums of SquaresWithinGroups).
This test reveals how much of the variation in the dependent variable are based in the
experimental manipulation relative to the individual variability of the participants who
elicited the dependent variable. Effect sizes for contrasts and t-tests are Cohen’s d, which
is defined as the difference between two means divided by their pooled standard
deviation (Meandifference / SDpooled). Based on literature recommendations, the pooled
standard deviation was adjusted based on correlations between conditions in order to
better determine the within-subjects detectability of effects (Lakens, 2013). Estimates of
effect size for small, medium, and large effects are 0.01, 0.06, and 0.14 respectively for
η2 and 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 respectively for cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), although recent
developments in statistics have added estimates of very large and huge effects, which
respectively refer to effect sizes of 1.2 and 2 (Sawilowsky, 2009).
In order to explore questions relating to the individual variability of subjects’
reading and response time with respect to schema and truth-value, a series of linear
mixed-effects regressions were conducted on the raw data, using the lme4 package in R
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Reading and response time was logtransformed, as is recommended to maintain assumptions of normality (Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The primary individual difference variable was CFQ score.
Cloze-probability was not included in these models for several reasons. First, each
experiment contained 36 participants and between 32-56 items, so in order to construct a
model that was both appropriately powered and meaningfully interpretable, I chose to
limit potential interactions to a three-way interaction instead of a four-way interaction.
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Second, CFQ is related to inhibitory control of distracting/irrelevant information,
specifically with respect to inhibiting such information from activating an inappropriate
prepotent response (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Because truth-value must be explicitly
considered in order to identify the appropriate response and cloze was only involved
during the determination of truth-value, I determined that truth-value was more relevant
to the relationship between cognitive-failures and schema than cloze-probability.
Therefore, the individual difference analyses in Linguistic-Expectancy and EmbeddedCue did not include cloze-probability as an independent variable. Subjects and items
were included as a random effect. Upon fitting the maximal model for random slopes,
slopes/intercepts were removed if they did not contribute significant variance to the
model, using the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015).
In order to remove variance accounted for by general practice effects or cognitive fatigue,
the linear effect of trial was included as a non-interacting fixed effect and the effect of
trial was included as a non-interacting random slope for subjects, thus removing variance
related to transient state-based practice/fatigue (Baayen, Vasishth, Kliegl, & Bates,
2017), allowing for the more precise examination of trait-based cognitive failures.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab and the experimenter familiarized them with the
task requirements. If they agree to give verbal informed consent, they completed a penand-paper version of the task. The experimenter gave instructions and feedback during
this time. Following the pen-and-paper version, the participants completed a practice
session on the computer. The practice session was identical to the actual experiment,
except feedback was provided after every response in order to train the participant on the
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task instructions; practice stimuli were similar but not identical. Participants must
perform at 67% accuracy on at least 12 trials; participants who were unable to reach 67%
by 30 trials did not perform the experiment due to inability to perform the task, but they
did receive participation credit. Before the trial, the computer screen presented the
response box instructions as a reminder. When participants were ready to begin, they
initiated the trial with a button press
The two-stimulus directed-deception test (DRT) was adapted for this experiment
(Vendemia, Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005). Participants evaluated the truth-value of a
sentence, hereafter referred to as stimulus 1 or S1, compare the evaluation with stimulus
2 (S2: “true” or “false”), and respond honestly/deceptively regarding whether or not S2
accurately reflects their S1 evaluation. Schema is cued by font color of S1 and S2 (redlie, blue-truth). These were not counterbalanced as prior research has shown that honest
and deceptive responses are not different across the color-cues (Vendemia & Buzan,
2003). The correct response was balanced, so that participants respond “agree” and
“disagree” at an equal rate to all schemas and truth-values. Deceptive and honest trials
were randomly presented so no between-trial pattern was presented, but color cues for S1
always matched color cues of S2. The primary difference between the DRT used in prior
studies and the DRT employed in the current study is that prior studies have generally
Given that preparedness to deceive can influence processing time effects (Vendemia,
Buzan, & Simon-Dack, 2005), I measured evaluation time and response time separately
to differentiate processing associated with response generation from truth-value and
preparedness to deceive.
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Study 1: Semantic-Relatedness
Methods
Participants
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in
this study for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
A subset of true, implausible, and anomalous items were selected from those that
passed the accuracy check in the Lexical Violation Item Development studies. Additional
items were constructed as needed in order to create a total of 64 items. I designed the
schema-cue to be orthogonal to truth-value by presenting each item’s true condition in
both information schemas (honesty and deception) while false conditions were
counterbalanced across information schemas. I counterbalanced the relation between
truth-value and schema-cue across participants as well as the exact probe word associated
with each of these conditions, so that each combination of truth-value, schema-cue, and
probe-word within each item was presented at an equal frequency across the entire study.
The entire set of 64 items are available in Appendix B, but only True, Implausible, and
Anomalous sentences were presented Semantic-Relatedness.
Procedure
Procedure was identical to item development procedures with one exception.
Following completion of the DRT, participants completed the cognitive-failures
questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982).
Results
Data screening
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Items that elicited accuracy rates of less than 67% in any of the six possible
conditions were removed from all analyses, which eliminated 7.81% of the data. All
inaccurate responses were removed, which eliminated 5.74% of the data. I calculated
means and standard deviation for each participant based on the screened data. Response
times and reading times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the
participant’s grand mean were replaced with that participant’s grand mean, a method
designed to use an individual participant’s data to impute data of their individual outliers
(Stevens, 2012). In total, 2.76% of the reading data was replaced and 2.59% of the
response data was replaced.
Sentence reading time
I conducted a 2 X 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of schema
(honesty vs. deception) and truth-value (true vs. implausible vs anomalous) on reading
time. There were significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=20.38, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.368
and truth-value, F(2,70)=17.51, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.21, but these effects were subject to an
interaction F (2,70)=6.96, p=0.0017, ηp2 =0.09. The main effects elicited large effect sizes
and the interaction elicited a medium effect size. Follow-up t-tests revealed that when
participants intended to be honest, reading time of sentences was faster than they
intended to be deceptive, with significant differences at the level of true-sentences
(M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs. M=3687 ms, SD=1515 ms), t(35)=5.54, p<0.0001, d =
1.14, implausible sentences (M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms vs. M=3961 ms, SD=1656 ms),
t(35)=-3.26, p=0.0012, d=-0.58, and anomalous sentences (M=3389 ms, SD=1376 ms vs.
M=3719 ms, SD=1617 ms), t(35)=-2.59, p=0.0068, d=-0.45. As is evident from the
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effect sizes, true sentences elicited more detectable differences between honesty and
deception than implausible and anomalous sentences. Results can be seen in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Semantic-Relatedness reading time results. Honest-schemas vary
in accords to truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas vary in accords to
explicit ambiguity resolution. Honest-schemas always faster than
deceptive=schemas
At the level of honest intentions, true sentences were read faster than implausible
sentences (M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs. M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms), t(35)=5.54,
p<0.0001, d = 1.04 as well as anomalous sentences (M=2979 ms, SD=1154 ms vs.
M=3389 ms, SD=1376 ms), t(35)=3.62, p=0.0004, d = 0.68, and anomalous sentences
were read faster than implausible sentences at a trending significant level (M=3389 ms,
SD=1376 ms vs. M=3559 ms, SD=1392 ms), t(35)=3.62, p=0.0004, d = 0.29. At the
level of deceptive-intentions, true sentences were read more quickly than implausible
sentences (M=3687 ms, SD=1515 ms vs. M=3941 ms, SD=1656 ms), t(35)=-3.51,
p=0.0006, d=-0.66, and anomalous sentences were also read more quickly than
implausible sentences (M=3719 ms, SD=1617 ms vs. M=3941 ms, SD=1656 ms),
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t(35)=-2.71, p=0.0051, d=0.50, but true sentences and anomalous sentences were read for
a similar amount of time.
Post-hoc analysis
A qualitative assessment of the reading time results suggested that the implausible
sentences were subject to a similar processing cost relative to the anomalous sentences
(approximately 200-250 ms). If the reading time cost was similar across schemas, then
that would suggest there was an additive factor that contributed specifically to reading
time of implausible sentences. If so, then after accounting for this factor, processing
requirements of false sentences appear similar under an honest schema, and processing
times of all sentences appear similar across a deceptive schema. I conducted a post-hoc
two-way analysis of variance, only testing the effect of schema (honesty vs. deception)
and truth-value within the false-sentences (implausible vs. anomalous). There were
significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=10.26, p=0.0029, ηp2 =0.23 and truth-value,
F(2,70)=8.09, p=0.0075, ηp2 =0.19, with no significant interaction observed between
these effects F<1. The results of the post-hoc analysis reveal similar effects of schema
across truth-value as well as similar effects of truth-value across schema, suggesting that
the implausible sentences were subject to an additive factor that was observed similarly
across schemas.
Individual differences
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain
unique variance in reading time at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, the results
are not reported.
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Probe response time
I conducted a 2 X 3 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of schema
(honesty × deception) and truth-value (true × implausible × anomalous) on response time.
There were significant main effects of schema F(1,35)=12.11, p=0.0013, ηp2 =0.257 and
truth-value, F(2,70)=4.28, p=0.017, ηp2 =0.057, but these main effects were subject to a
significant interaction, F(2,70)=21.18, p<0.0001, ηp2 =0.23. The effect of schema was
large and the effect of truth-value was medium, but that the interaction effect size was
large suggests that these effects differed heavily across conditions. Results can be seen in
Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Semantic-Relatedness response time results. Honest-schemas
vary in accords to truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas vary in accords
to relatedness to entrenched concepts. Honest-schemas faster than
deceptive=schemas for all sentence-types except Anomalous
Follow-up t-tests revealed that the effect of schema varied as a function of truthvalue. Honest responses were faster than deceptive responses at the level of true
sentences (M=658 ms, SD=151 ms vs. M=786 ms, SD=236 ms), t(35)=-5.84, p<0.0001,
d=-1.24, as well as for implausible sentences (M=718 ms, SD=163 ms vs. M=779 ms,
SD=256 ms), t(35)=-2.92, p=0.0031, d=-0.69, but there was no significant difference
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between honest and deceptive responses to anomalous sentences t<1. The effect of truthvalue on response time differed across schema. When participants responded honestly,
true sentences elicited faster responses than both implausible sentences (M=658 ms,
SD=151 ms vs. M=718 ms, SD=163 ms), t(35)=5.91, p<0.0001, d=-1.01 and anomalous
sentences (M=658 ms, SD=151 ms vs. M=727 ms, SD=172 ms), t(35)=-5.38, p<0.0001,
d=-0.93, but honest responses were similar across implausible and anomalous false
sentences. t<1. When participants responded deceptively, anomalous sentences elicited
faster responses than both true sentences (M=738 ms, SD=247 ms vs. M=786 ms,
SD=236 ms), t(35)=2.96, p=0.006, d=0.49 and implausible sentences (M=738 ms,
SD=247 ms vs. M=779 ms, SD=256 ms), t(35)=3.27, p=0.002, d=0.55, but deceptive
responses were similar across true and implausible sentences t<1.
Individual differences
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain
unique variance in response time at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, the
results are not reported.
Discussion
Honest schemas elicited faster reading times than deceptive schemas, and the
effects of truth-value interacted with schema. Honest schemas elicited faster reading time
to true sentences than both implausible and anomalous sentences, which were read faster
than implausible sentences. Contrarily, deceptive-schemas, elicited similar reading times
for true and implausible sentences, both of which were read faster than implausible
sentences. Post-hoc analyses revealed that reading time of implausible sentences was
subject to an additive factor relative to anomalous sentences which affected honest and
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deceptive schemas. These analyses suggest that, after accounting for implausibility cost,
deceptive-schemas elicited similar reading times across sentences. True sentences elicited
larger differences between honesty and deception than both implausible and anomalous
sentences, which elicited similar differences between honesty and deception.
Response time patterns differed from reading time patterns. Overall, honest
responses were faster than deceptive responses, but unlike reading times, this was not
stable across sentences. True sentences elicited the largest differences between honesty
and deception, followed by implausible sentences, whereas anomalous sentences elicited
similar response times between honesty and deception. Follow-up analyses revealed that
honest-schemas elicited faster responses to true sentences than to both implausible and
anomalous sentences, which did not differ from one another. Deceptive-schemas elicited
similar response times to true and implausible sentences, both of which were slower than
response times to anomalous sentences. CFQ had no effect, suggesting that cognitive
failures are irrelevant to these phenomena.
Honest schemas activate explicit processes to supplement implicit processes
As the Binding Suppression Model predicts, the largest factor of reading time was
whether the presence/absence of semantic activation (schema: honesty vs. deception)
would enable/suppress access to entrenched concepts in LTM (truth-value: true vs.
implausible vs. anomalous). As predicted, honest schemas elicited the fastest reading and
response times when semantic activation was extensively triggered (true sentences)
relative to when evaluative processes required conscious search/retrieval (implausible /
anomalous sentences). Following sentence-evaluation, honest-schemas encoded truthvalue effectively, as evidenced by honest response times varying in accordance to truth-
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value, with no differences across false sentences (true < implausible = anomalous).
However, deceptive-schemas elicited a more complex response time pattern. Sentences
that were the least related to entrenched concepts (anomalous sentences) required the
least amount of cognitive effort (Anomalous < Implausible = True). This effect is
intriguing, as it is a complete reversal of what is normally observed when examining
comprehension and responding to true and false sentences.
Deceptive schemas inhibit the role of implicit memory processes
The Binding-Suppression Model predicted that deceptive schemas would
proactively inhibit semantic activation, relegating all memory processes to proceed via
conscious search/retrieval. Therefore, stimuli capable of triggering semantic activation
would elicit distinct memory processes under honest and deceptive schemas, but stimuli
incapable of triggering implicit semantic activation would elicit similar memory
processes under honest and deceptive schemas. Therefore, the Binding-Suppression
Model predicts that differences between honesty and deception should be directly related
to a stimulus’ latent capacity to trigger implicit semantic activation, because honest
schemas activate semantic-memory and deception will suppress it.
My data supported this prediction in both reading and response times. True
sentences elicited the largest behavioral differences between honesty and deception
relative to implausible and anomalous sentences. The different effects of schema on
anomalous sentences across reading and response time strongly suggest that bindingsuppression is initiated during sentence-evaluation, as evidenced by the stable effects of
deception across reading time. However, binding-suppression may not be stably involved
during response-generation. If deceptive-schemas elicited a broad binding-suppression
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effect during response-generation, there should have been effects of deception across all
sentences, instead of only true and implausible sentences. Therefore, detecting deception
during response-generation may require careful control of the previously evaluated
content in order to maximize the detectability of deception instead of ameliorate it.
It is possible that binding-suppression is differently involved across sentenceevaluation and response-generation, but the unbalanced design is potential confound.
Although prior research suggests that false evaluations are qualitatively different than
true evaluations (McCloskey & Bigler, 1980; Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981), research
also suggests that contextual effects related to stimuli alters strategic processing (Lorch,
1981; Reder, 1987). Furthermore such context effects can strongly alter how concepts are
activated and responded to (Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014; Saunders & MacLeod,
2006). Based on these findings, it is possible that the multiple false conditions increased
ambiguity of false evaluations relative to true evaluations. I examined if semantic-relation
effects generalize across truth-values by conducting Linguistic-Expectancy.
If I observed unique effects of schema, then this pattern should be stable in
Linguistic-Expectancy, such that if I presented only true and implausible sentences,
deceptive-schemas should elicit response times to implausible sentences that replicate the
current experiment. Contrarily, if task-parameters drove the effect, that suggests that
deceptive-schemas are influenced by content of neighboring deceptive-schemas, even if
they are irrelevant to the current task. Therefore, if I presented only true and implausible
sentences, deceptive-schemas should elicit response times to implausible sentences that
replicate the anomalous sentences reported in the current experiment.
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Regardless of the source of the response time effects, the reading time effects
suggest that deceptive-schemas and honest-schemas conduct sentence-evaluation very
differently. If these effects are replicated, that would suggest that deceptive-schemas
initiate binding-suppression during sentence-evaluation. Such a replication would be
strong evidence that the cognitive demands of deception are behaviorally observable long
before motoric generation of a lie response. Further deception research examining the
unique signatures of deception during sentence-evaluation as they are distinct from
response-generation would greatly expand the precision with which deception can be
detected. Linguistic-Expectancy examined the generalizability of these effects by
manipulating two factors within sentence-evaluation: sentence-integration (constructing
the propositional message of the sentence) and truth-value disambiguation (evaluating
whether the sentence’s propositional message accurately reflects world knowledge)
Study 2: Linguistic expectancy
The first study suggested that honest and deceptive schemas were similarly
influenced by explicit processes related to truth-value ambiguity, as evidenced by the
longer reading time of implausible sentences relative to the anomalous sentences. The
response time results suggest that deceptive schemas were more influenced by SemanticRelatedness than truth-value, as evidenced by longer deceptive responses to true and
implausible than anomalous sentences. However, the unbalanced item design precluded
strong conclusions. In order to examine truth-value as separate from semantic-relation of
sentence-content, I manipulated expectancy of the object-noun and the truth-value of the
sentence. These were orthogonally manipulated via altering the verb to elicit differential
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degrees of expectancy (i.e. cloze-probability) and by altering the object-noun to elicit
differential evaluations of sentence truth-value.
According to the Prepotent Inhibition Model, deceptive-schemas do not inhibit
semantic memory, but rather motor-responses are delayed until conscious awareness can
evaluate response-generation. If so, the facilitative effect of entrenched concepts could be
nullified in response time. But, entrenchment should still influence sentence-evaluation
for two reasons: 1) Sentence-evaluation requires a single button-press, so there is no
response-ambiguity to consider and 2) entrenched concepts should be more easily
evaluated than novel concepts. Therefore, the Prepotent-Inhibition Model predicts similar
deceptive response times across true and false sentences, but faster reading time for true
relative to false sentences. The model’s prediction for expectancy is uncertain
According to the Binding-Suppression Model, deception alters the manner in
which memory is accessed during sentence-evaluation. Deceptive-schemas suppress
implicit semantic activation, and instead, LTM is consciously and exhaustively searched.
This hypothesis argues that deception devalues good-enough heuristics and explicitly
evaluates relevant information (Mayo, 2015; Mayo, Alfasi, & Schwarz, 2014; Posten &
Mussweiler, 2013; Friesen & Sinclair, 2011; Kleiman, Sher, Elster, & Mayo, 2015)
I predict that under an honest-schema, Linguistic-Expectancy will influence
sentence-evaluation, such that higher cloze-probability will reduce reading time, but
following sentence-evaluation, there will be no effect of cloze-probability on responsegeneration. With respect to deceptive-schemas, I hypothesize that neither linguistic
expectancy nor truth-value will inform sentence-evaluation, and expectancy will not
influence response-generation. However, based on Semantic-Relatedness, I hypothesize
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that false sentences will elicit faster responses than true sentences. Therefore, if either
expectancy or truth-value inform reading and response times in a similar manner as
honest-schemas, my hypothesis is not supported. But if such effects are nullified or even
reversed, the results will support and further inform the Binding-Suppression Model.
Methods
Participants
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in
this study for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
Forty sentences were constructed that varied in truth-value (true vs. false) and
cloze-probability (low vs. high). I adapted materials from Semantic-Relatedness in
accords with prior materials and validations of cloze-probability (Bloom & Fischler,
1980; Block & Baldwin, 2010; Hahn, 2012) to suit the demands of my parameters (e.g.

Figure 3.3: Effect of Entropy on Deceptive and Honest Responding as
Predicted by the Binding Suppression Model
truth-value, cloze-probability, subject-categories, psycholinguistic controls, etc.).
Stimuli consisted of 40 subject-nouns (20 animals and 20 humans) which began a
three-word sentence with a syntactic structure of Subject-Verb-Object. For each sentence,

69

the subject-noun was constant (e.g. Archers, Chickens), but the verb and the object were
manipulated, creating a total of four distinct three-word sentences for each subject-noun.
The verb was manipulated so as to construct a context where the object-noun was highly
predictable (e.g. Archers shoot, Chickens lay) or where the object-noun was less
expected, but both verb-contexts agreed on the most likely completion (e.g. Archers
prepare, Chickens guard). The object was manipulated so as to construct a sentence that
was either true (Archers shoot arrows, Chickens lay eggs) or false (Archers shoot bullets,
Chickens lay rocks). The entire set of 40 items are presented in Appendix C.
Procedure
Procedure was identical to Semantic-Relatedness
Results
Data screening
For reading time and response time analyses, I removed all items which elicited
accuracy rates of less than 67% in any of the six possible conditions. This resulted in an
elimination of 2.5% of the data. I then eliminated all inaccurate responses, which resulted
in an elimination of 5.36% of the data. I calculated means and standard deviation for each
participant based on the accurate items and accurate trials. Response times and reading
times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the participant’s mean were
replaced with their overall mean for that dependent variable. For reading times, 2.96% of
the data was replaced and for response times, 2.54% of the data was replaced.
Sentence reading time
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on
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reading time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=10.59, p=0.0025,
η2=0.23, truth-value, F(1,35)=12.14, p=0.0013, η2=0.26, and cloze F(1,35)=9.72,
p=0.0036, η2 =0.22. These main effects were subject to a trending interaction between
schema and truth-value F(1,35)=3.51, p=0.069, η2 =0.09 and a significant interaction
between schema and cloze F(1,35)=5.99, p=0.019, η2 =0.13. No other interactions were
significant, Fs<1. The effect sizes related to schema and truth-value were large, while the
effect sizes of cloze and all interactions were medium.
The main effect of schema revealed that honest schemas elicited faster reading
time than deceptive schemas (M=3361 ms, SD=1177 ms vs. M=4388 ms, SD=2277 ms).
The main effect of truth-value revealed that true sentences were read faster than false
sentences (M=3699 ms, SD=1426 ms vs. M=4045 ms, SD=1704 ms). The main effect of
cloze revealed that high-cloze sentences were read faster than low-cloze sentences
(M=3767 ms, SD=1564 ms vs. M=3974 ms, SD=1534 ms). However, the two-way
interaction between schema and cloze as well as the trending two-way interaction

Figure 3.4: Linguistic-Expectancy reading time results. Honest-schemas vary in
accords to cloze-probability and truth-value whereas deceptive-schemas require
similar reading time across all sentence-types. Honest-schemas always faster than
deceptive-schemas
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between schema and truth-value suggested that the effects of cloze and truth-value
differed as a function of whether participants intended to be honest or deceptive.
Although honest-schemas elicited reading times that varied in accordance with sentencecontent, deceptive-schemas suppress this variability (Figure 3.4).
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted to follow up these interactions.
Under an honest schema, reading times were significantly influenced by cloze
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=21.28, p<0.0001, η2 =0.38 and truth-value
F(1,35)=18.63, p=0.0001, η2 =0.35, but there was no interaction between these effects.
The simple main effects revealed that high-cloze sentences were read faster than lowcloze sentences (M=3187 ms, SD=1153 ms vs. M=3542 ms, SD=1244 ms) and true
sentences were read faster than false sentences (M=3118 ms, SD=1071 ms vs. M=3611
ms, SD=1347 ms). Contrarily, under a deceptive schema, reading time was not
significantly influenced by cloze or truth-value, and there was no interaction between
these effects, all Fs<1.6.
In order to evaluate the influence of these effects on the detectability of deception,
I conducted one-tailed t-tests to examine the difference between honesty and deception
across all sentence types. Honest schemas elicited faster reading times than deceptive
schemas at the level of low-cloze true sentences (M=3287 ms, SD=1080 ms vs. M=4349
ms, SD=2040 ms), t(35)= -3.75, p=0.0003, d= -0.72, high-cloze true sentences (M=2950,
SD=1160 ms vs. M=4255 ms, SD=2275 ms), t(35)= -3.97, p=0.0001, d= -0.76, low-cloze
false sentences (M=3797 ms, SD=1511 ms vs. M=4461 ms, SD=2434 ms), t(35)= -1.85,
p=0.036, d=0.33, and high-cloze false sentences (M=3425 ms, SD=1267 ms vs. M=4501
ms, SD=2609 ms), t(35)= -2.87, p=0.0034, d=0.56.
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Individual differences
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain
unique variance at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, results are not reported.
Probe response time
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on
response time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=16.17, p=0.0003,
η2 =0.32 and truth-value, F(1,35)=4.522, p=0.041, η2 =0.11. These main effects were
subject to a significant interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=19.25,
p<0.0001, η2 =0.35. The effect sizes for schema was large while the effect size for truthvalue was medium, but the interaction effect size was large, suggesting that the effect of
schema and truth-value on response time varied heavily as a function of this interaction.
Results are seen in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5: Linguistic-Expectancy response time results. Honest-responses are
faster than deceptive responses only at the level of true sentences.
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Simple main effects contrasts were conducted to examine the influence of truthvalue across schemas. These tests revealed that under an honest schema, truth-value
significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=40.75, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.538, such that
true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (M=661 ms, SD=166 ms vs.
M=730 ms, SD=181 ms). However, under a deceptive schema, truth-value only elicited a
trending significant effect on response times F(1,35)=3.09, p=0.087, η2 = 0.081, which
suggested that false sentences elicited faster response times than true sentences (M=776
ms, SD=242 ms vs. M=745 ms, SD=236 ms).
To further understand the interaction, simple main effect contrasts were
conducted to examine schema across truth-values. These tests revealed that when
participants responded to a true sentence, schema significantly influenced response times
F(1,35)=34.90, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.50, such that honest schemas elicited faster response
times than deceptive schemas (M=661 ms, SD=166 ms vs. M=776 ms, SD=236 ms).
However, when participants encountered a false sentence, there was no effect of schema
on reading times, F<2. Taken together, these findings suggest that false sentences elicited
no differences between honesty and deception, and that relative to their respective
responses to false sentences, honest responses were facilitated by true sentences while
deceptive responses appeared to encounter interference from true sentences.
Individual differences
The lmer analysis revealed that individual differences in CFQ did not explain
unique variance at any level of analysis. Due to its redundancy, results are not reported.
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Discussion
The patterns associated with reading times were overall similar to patterns
observed in Semantic-Relatedness. Honest schemas elicited faster reading time than
deceptive schemas across all sentence types, but the effect of schema interacted
separately with both truth-value and cloze-probability. Under honest-schema, both truthvalue and cloze-probability elicited the expected main effects (truth-value: true < false;
cloze-probability: high-cloze < low-cloze). Neither of these effects were observed under
deceptive schemas; similar reading times across all sentence types.
Following sentence evaluation, there was an interaction between truth-value and
schema on response times, with no effect of cloze-probability. Following a true sentence,
honest responses were faster than deceptive responses, but there was no difference
between honest and deceptive response times following a false sentence. The reason for
this nonsignificant difference on false sentences is that honest responses were faster
following true sentences than false sentences, whereas there was a trend for deceptive
responses to true sentences to be slower than deceptive responses to false sentences. CFQ
had no effect, suggesting that cognitive failures are irrelevant to these phenomena.
As in Experiment 1, the Binding-Suppression Model predicts that the largest
difference between honesty and deception should be associated with stimuli that are most
capable of triggering implicit semantic activation. Under an honest schema, implicit
semantic activation facilitates both initial construction of STM representations as well as
subsequent operations on those representations, but under a deceptive schema, implicit
processes are nullified, requiring similar amount of explicit search/retrieval regardless of
implicit semantic relationships between stimuli. My data supported this prediction.
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Sentence evaluation reflects long term memory retrieval
The Binding-Suppression Model predicts that honest schemas evaluate sentences
based on an interdependency of implicit and explicit memory processes. Implicit
semantic activation operates first, rapidly retrieving semantically-related information and
explicit memory search/retrieval bolsters this representation if the semantic-activation is
not sufficient to trigger decision thresholds. As the deficit between semantic-activation
and decision-threshold grows, a greater amount of explicit search/retrieval is needed to
supplement the impoverished mental representation. Similarly, as the coherence between
semantic activation and a relevant entrenched concept become increasingly aligned, the
amount of required search/retrieval decreases to a comparable degree. Both truth-value
and cloze-probability contributed distinct sources of variance in sentence-evaluation, and
this orthogonal contribution is reflected in the reading times of honest-schemas
Contrary to honest schemas, where sentence-evaluation is predictably informed
by a multitude of sources, linguistic-experience and world-knowledge are irrelevant to
deceptive-schemas. It appears that following the activation of binding-suppression,
decision-thresholds are no longer directed in accordance to one’s lifelong experience with
that language can mean, whether it be statistical distributions of lexical items or the LTM
structures that organize and store world-knowledge. Although the Informational
Exchange Schema Theory predicts that deceptive-schemas sufficiently emphasize the
liar’s personal goals such that the liar’s world knowledge is deemed irrelevant, it is
remarkable how apt a description that is with respect to the current results.
After identifying that deceptive-schemas were observed to nullify the role of
LTM structures in sentence-evaluation, I examined if this nullification was inherent to the
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concept of a deceptive-schema or if this nullification was driven by the specific
parameters of the deceptive-schema adopted for these particular studies. So far, the
deceptive-schemas in this dissertation have constructed a deceptive-signal that consists of
a perceptual color-cue. If the deceptive-signal alters LTM accessibility in accordance to
the features of the deceptive-signal itself, then all previous deceptive-signals would not
activate semantic-content within LTM. Colors have no relation to sentence-content, so
even if certain LTM structures were accessible (e.g. color-hues, color-terms), the
experiments were not designed to observe activation. The final study of this dissertation
was designed to test if the relationship between the deceptive-signal and LTM access.
The final study of this dissertation, known as Embedded-Cue, the deceptive-signal
consisted of a categorical judgement, which required participants to identify the topic of
the sentence, and if the topic matched the deceptive-signal, then it required a deceptive
response. If binding-suppression nullifies LTM retrieval entirely, then the relation of the
deceptive-signal to the embedded-cue should elicit similar null effects in sentenceevaluation as the color-cue did in Linguistic Expectancy. But if the deceptive-signal
restructures LTM access in some capacity, then the relation of the embedded-cue to the
deceptive-signal should influence sentence-evaluation.
Study 3: Embedded-Cue
Experiments 1 and 2 examined how deception and honesty differ between
responding to different levels of truth-value prepotency. However, both experiments
involved participants knowing immediately whether they were going to be deceptive or
honest, regardless of the meaning of the sentence. But that is not an accurate
representation of how deception is carried out in the real-world, so the generalizability of
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these findings to real-world deception is suspect. Language-comprehension processes
differ based on the task-demands of the experimental context, as is evident in other, nondeceptive experiments (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, & Nitsch, 1974; Kintsch
& Mangalath, 2011; Barsalou & Medin, 1986).
In order to better understand how one decides to be either deceptive or honest, I
examined how linguistic information can be used to direct that decision. Participants
responded to sentences similar to those in previous studies, but instead of being cued by
font-color, participants were deceived based on whether the sentence contains a human or
a non-human animal (or vice-versa). Therefore, participants needed to determine truthvalue while they simultaneously determine whether or not to deceive. By requiring
participants to monitor the actual sentence content for schema-disambiguation, I can
examine the degree to which the decision-to-deceive interacts with languagecomprehension processes in order to generate a deceptive-response.
Methods
Participants
36 undergraduate students from the University of South Carolina participated in
this study for extra credit in a psychology course
Materials
The items from Linguistic-Expectancy were reviewed and judged for inclusion in
Embedded-Cue. In order to prevent ambiguity in the semantic categorization task, items
that contained both humans and animals in any of their conditions were removed (e.g.
cowboys ride horses, shepherds herd sheep). Of the items that remained, items were
judged with respect to the accuracy criterion in Linguistic-Expectancy, so as to ensure
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only those items that elicited sufficiently accurate responses were selected for inclusion
in Embedded-Cue, resulting in 32 items (16 animal-subjects and 16 human-subjects). To
ensure that the list of 32 items were similarly valid as the list of 40 items, I evaluated the
new list of items on psycholinguistic control variables, cloze-probability, and truth-value.
No differences were observed across truth-value and cloze-probability in psycholinguistic
control variables. The average cloze-probability obtained for these 32 items was as
follows: Low-cloze (M=46.09%, SD=15.04%), high-cloze (M=82.34%, SD=15.21%).
The truth-values for the four sentences was as follows: low-cloze true (M=4.52,
SD=0.27), high-cloze true (M=4.67, SD=0.23), low-cloze false (M=1.73, SD=0.30), highcloze false (M=1.65, SD=0.35). Cloze-probability did not have a significant effect on
truth-value, suggesting that the cloze-probability manipulation of the verb did not
influence the truth-value manipulation of the object-noun. All four conditions of the 32
items were presented to participants, resulting in a total of 128 sentences. These items are
available in Appendix D:
Procedure
Procedure was identical to Linguistic-Expectancy with the exception of how the
participants were cued to deceive. Instead of being cued to deceive based on the color of
the sentence, participants were instructed to determine whether the sentence conveyed
information about a human (e.g. archers, mechanics, janitors) or a non-human animal
(e.g. chickens, eagles, beavers), and to adopt an honest or deceptive schema based on this
decision. The schema-category relationship was counterbalanced across participants to
ensure honesty and deception were connected to humans and animals at an equal
frequency. Due to the schema-cue no longer being orthogonal to the sentence content, it
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was impossible to counterbalance the truth-value of an item with the schema-cue.
Therefore, whereas in Semantic-Relatedness and Linguistic-Expectancy, I presented half
of the sentences within an item as an honest schema and the other half as a deceptive
schema, in Embedded-Cue, each individual participant responded 100% honestly or
100% deceptively to a particular item. Counterbalancing across participants ensured that
each sentence was associated to honesty and deception with equal frequency, but this
equality occurred across participants instead of within.
Data analyses
Data analyses were similar to Semantic-Relatedness.
Results
Data screening
For reading time and response time analyses, I eliminated all inaccurate
responses, which resulted in an elimination of 5.29% of the data. I calculated means and
standard deviation for each participant based on the accurate trials. Response times and
reading times that were less than 300 ms or 2.5 SDs away from the participant’s mean
were replaced with their grand mean for that dependent variable. For response times,
2.84% of the data were replaced and for reading times, 2.71% of the data were replaced.
Sentence reading time
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on
reading time. There were significant main effects of schema, F(1,35)=19.06, p<0.0001,
η2=0.35 truth-value, F(1,35)=13.85, p=0.001, η2 =0.28, and cloze F(1,35)=7.07, p=0.011,
η2 =0.17. There was an interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=7.82,
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p=0.0083, η2=0.18. All other effects and interactions were insignificant, Fs<1. The effect
sizes of schema, truth-value, cloze, and the interaction between schema and truth-value
were all large. Reading times for sentences containing embedded schema cues varied
according to cloze probability for both schemas, but truth-value only exerted an effect on
honest-schemas (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6: Embedded-Cue reading time results. Honest-schemas were influenced by
cloze-probability and truth-value but deceptive-schemas were only influenced by
cloze-probability. Honest-schemas were consistently faster than deceptive schemas.
The main effect of schema revealed that honest schemas elicited faster reading
time than deceptive schemas (M=3836 ms, SD=1721 ms vs. M=4508 ms, SD=2299 ms).
The main effect of truth-value revealed that true sentences were read more quickly than
false sentences (M=3984 ms, SD=1870 ms vs. M=4360 ms, SD=2124 ms). The main
effect of cloze revealed that high-cloze sentences were read more quickly than low-cloze
sentences (M=4274 ms, SD=1972 ms vs. M=4070 ms, SD=2010 ms).
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted in order to examine the effect of
truth-value across schemas. These tests revealed that under an honest schema, truth-value
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=18.57, p=0.0001, η2 = 0.35, such that true
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sentences were read more quickly than false sentences (M=3467 ms, SD=1518 ms vs.
M=4206 ms, SD=2037 ms). Contrarily, under a deceptive schema, there was no effect of
truth-value on reading times, F<1.
To further understand the interaction, simple main effects were conducted to
examine the effect of schema across truth-values. When participants read true sentences,
schema significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=17.09, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.328,
such that honesty elicited faster reading times than deception (M=3467 ms, SD=1518 ms
vs. M=4502 ms, SD=2411 ms). When participants read false sentences, schema
significantly influenced reading times F(1,35)=5.16, p=0.029, η2 = 0.13, such that
honesty elicited faster reading times than deception (M=4206 ms, SD=2037 ms vs.
M=4514 ms, SD=2282 ms). Therefore, the source of the interaction between schema and
truth-value is that truth-value influenced reading times when participants intended to be
honest, but not when they intended to be deceptive, which means that honesty and
deception are most easily distinguished under true sentences because false sentences
shrink the difference between honesty and deception by increasing the reading time of
honesty without influencing reading time of deception.
To identify how these effects influenced the detectability of deception, one-paired
t-tests were conducted to examine the difference between honest and deceptive schemas
across all sentence types. These tests revealed that honest schemas elicited significantly
faster reading times than deceptive schemas at the level of low-cloze true sentences
(M=3619 ms, SD=1560 ms vs. M=4665 ms, SD=2551 ms), t(35)= -3.14, p=0.001, d= 0.62, high-cloze true sentences (M=3314 ms, SD=1647 ms vs. M=4446 ms, SD=2483
ms), t(35)= -4.51, p<0.0001, d= -0.91, low-cloze false sentences (M=4294 ms, SD=2122
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ms vs. M=4630 ms, SD=2375 ms), t(35)= -2.02, p=0.025, d=0.40, and at a trending
significant level for high-cloze false sentences (M=4118 ms, SD=2067 ms vs. M=4492
ms, SD=2353 ms), t(35)= -1.62, p=0.057, d=0.31.
Individual differences
The lmer analysis replicated the overall findings from the ANOVA analysis, such
that true sentences were read more quickly than false sentences (β=0.18, t=7.36,
p<0.001), honest responses were faster than deceptive responses (β=0.21, t=7.49,
p<0.001), and as the interaction coefficient for truth-value:Schema is negative (β=-0.15,
t=6.02, p<0.001) and the main effect coefficients are positive, the difference between
true and false sentences is much smaller when participants intended to respond
deceptively than when they intended to respond honestly. As expected, numeric value of
trial reduced response times, such that as participants became more experienced with the
paradigm, they made faster responses (β=-0.10, t=-5.60, p<0.001).
Table 3.1: LMER analysis of reading time in Embedded-Cue, as
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ
B
(Intercept)
7.95
Trial
-0.27
Truth-Value (true vs. false)
0.18
Schema (honest vs. deception) 0.21
CFQ
0.04
Truth-Value x Intention
-0.15
Truth-Value x CFQ
0.02
Schema x CFQ
-0.01
Truth-Value x Schema x CFQ -0.07

CI
t
p
7.82 – 8.08
123.6 <.001
-0.33 – -0.20 -7.86 <.001
0.13 – 0.23
7.36 <.001
0.16 – 0.27
7.49 <.001
-0.07 – 0.15
0.66 0.517
-0.20 – -0.10 -6.02 <.001
-0.02 – 0.05
0.84 0.392
-0.06 – 0.05 -0.21 0.853
-0.12 – -0.02 -2.67 0.006

There was no main effect of CFQ nor was there an interaction between CFQ and
schema or between CFQ and truth-value, but there was a significant three-way interaction
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(β=-0.07, t=-2.67, p=0.006). The lack of a main effect of CFQ or an interaction with
other main effects reveals that CFQ did not overtly influence reading time specifically of
any specific condition. Instead, it influenced the relationship between other conditions.
As seen in Figure 3.7, when those with lower rate of cognitive-failures adopted a
deceptive schema, they were more likely to read true sentences faster than false sentences
whereas those who reported higher rates of cognitive failures were more likely to read
false sentences faster than true sentences.

Figure 3.7: LMER analysis of reading time in Embedded-Cue
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ.
Probe response time
I conducted a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, examining the effect of
schema (honesty vs. deception), truth-value (true vs false), and cloze (low vs. high) on
response time. There were main effects of schema F(1,35)=15.86, p<0.0001, η2 =0.31 and
truth-value F(1,35)=8.12, p=0.0073, η2 =0.188. These effects were subject to an
interaction between schema and truth-value F(1,35)=23.32, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.40. All
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other effects and interactions were insignificant, Fs<1.5. The effect sizes of schema,
truth-value, and the interaction between schema and truth-value were all large.
Simple main effects contrasts were conducted in order to identify the source of
the interaction between schema and truth-value. These tests revealed that under an honest
schema, truth-value significantly influenced response times F(1,35)=34.08, p<0.0001,
η2=0.493, such that true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (M=706
ms, SD=181 ms vs. M=807 ms, SD=181 ms). Under a deceptive schema, the effect of
truth-value influenced response times at a trending significant level F(1,35)=3.69,
p=0.063, η2 = 0.10, such that false sentences elicited faster responses than true sentences
(M=789 ms, SD=244 ms vs. M=821 ms, SD=206 ms). Given that Linguistic-Expectancy
suggested true sentences delayed deceptive responses, I conducted a one-tailed t-test to
evaluate significance level in a more hypothesis-driven manner, and the test revealed that
true sentences elicited significantly slower deceptive response times than false sentences
t(35)=-1.81, p=0.039, d=0.47.
To further understand the interaction, simple main effect contrasts were
conducted to examine the effect of schema across the truth-values. These tests revealed
that when participants responded to a true sentence, schema significantly influenced
response times F(1,35)=57.05, p<0.0001, η2 = 0.62, such that honest responses were
faster than deceptive responses (M=691 ms, SD=174 ms vs. M=821 ms, SD=206 ms).
However, when responding to a false sentence, the effect of schema was not significant,
F<1. Only true sentences were capable of eliciting significant differences between honest
and deceptive responses, as seen in Figure 3.8
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Figure 3.8: Embedded-Cue response time results. Honest-responses are
faster than deceptive responses only at the level of true sentences.

Overall, these effects replicated prior effects, revealing that true sentences elicited
the largest differences between honesty and deception while false sentences did not elicit
significant differences. Furthermore, this study replicated the effect of truth-value on
schema in response times, such that relative to false sentences, true sentences facilitated
honest responses while they interfered with deceptive responses.
Individual difference analysis
The lmer analysis replicated the overall findings from the ANOVA analysis, such
that true sentences elicited faster responses than false sentences (β=0.14, t=10.27,
p<0.001), honest responses were faster than deceptive responses (β=0.18, t=8.69,
p<0.001), and as the interaction coefficient for truth-value:Schema (β=-0.20, t=10.38,
p<0.001) is both negative and larger than either of the positive main effect coefficients,
deceptive responses to false sentences are faster than deceptive responses to true
sentences. As expected, numeric value of trial reduced response times, such that as
participants became more experienced with the paradigm, they made faster responses
(β=-0.10, t=-5.60, p<0.001).
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Table 3.4: LMER analysis of response time in Embedded-Cue, as
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ
log(Response Time)
β

CI

t

p

(Intercept)

6.45

6.39 – 6.51

203.43

<.001

Trial

-0.10

-0.13 – -0.06

-5.60

<.001

Truth-Value (true vs. false)

0.14

0.11 – 0.16

10.27

<.001

Schema (honest vs. deception)

0.18

0.14 – 0.22

8.69

<.001

CFQ

0.14

0.08 – 0.20

4.64

<.001

Truth-Value x Intention

-0.20

-0.24 – -0.16

-10.38

<.001

Truth-Value x CFQ

-0.02

-0.05 – 0.00

-1.74

0.081

Schema x CFQ

0.02

-0.02 – 0.05

0.05

0.02 – 0.09

0.79
2.83

0.446

Truth-Value x Schema x CFQ

0.005

Individual differences in CFQ had a positive effect on response time, such that
those who reported lower levels of cognitive failures elicited faster responses than those
who reported higher levels of cognitive failures (β=-0.14, t=4.64, p<0.001). There was a
trending interaction between truth-value and CFQ, such that there was a greater
difference between true and false sentences at lower levels of CFQ relative to higher
levels of CFQ (β=-0.02, t=1.74, p=0.081). However, the three-way interaction revealed
that the effect of CFQ on truth-value differed across honest and deceptive responses
(β=0.05, t=2.83, p=0.005).
As depicted in Figure 3.9, honest responses to true sentences were faster than to
false sentences, but a trending significant two-way interaction suggests that this
difference was larger at lower rates of cognitive failures. The three-way interaction
reveals that CFQ did not alter the difference between honest and deceptive responses at
the level of true sentences (solid lines in Figure 3.9), but CFQ did alter the difference
between honest and deceptive responses at the level of false sentences (dashed lines in
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Figure 3.9). At lower levels of CFQ, honest and deceptive responses to false sentences
were relatively similar whereas at higher levels of CFQ, there was a marked difference.
The cause of this difference is that CFQ delayed deceptive responses to false sentences to
a greater extent than it did honest responses to false sentences, which had the dual effect
of making deceptive responses to false sentences slower than honest responses to false
sentences as well as removing the significant differences between deceptive responses to
true and false sentences that was evident at lower levels of CFQ. In sum, CFQ moderated
the effect of truth-value on response times, with the effect of truth-value on honest
responses being more resilient than the effect of truth-value on deceptive responses.

Figure 3.9: LMER analysis of response time in Embedded-Cue
predicted by truth-value, schema, and individual differences in CFQ
predicting reading time
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Discussion
Review of reading and response time results
Honest-schemas within Embedded-Cue replicated the reading time effects
observed in Linguistic-Expectancy: true sentences were read faster than false sentences,
high-cloze sentences were read faster than low-cloze sentences, true sentences elicited
faster responses than false sentences, and cloze-probability did not influence response
time. These findings suggest that monitoring for an embedded-cue did not introduce an
additive factor onto sentence-evaluation relative to monitoring for a perceptual-cue.
Contrarily, deceptive-schemas in Embedded-Cue elicited different reading time patterns
as those observed in Linguistic-Expectancy. Although the null effect of truth-value on
reading time of deceptive-schemas was replicated across both experiments, the effect of
cloze-probability differed across experiments. Whereas Linguistic-Expectancy only
elicited an effect of cloze-probability for reading time under honest-schemas, the
Embedded-Cue revealed a main effect of cloze-probability on reading time for both
honest and deceptive-schemas In summary, when participants monitored for a color-cue,
there was no effect of sentence-content, either through cloze-probability or truth-value
whereas when participants monitored for an embedded-cue, cloze-probability facilitated
reading time while truth-value replicated color-cues and elicited null effects.
Following sentence-evaluation, response time patterns for honest and deceptive
schemas followed a similar pattern as previously observed: Honest responses to true
sentences were faster than honest responses to false sentences whereas deceptive
responses showed the opposite pattern, such that deceptive responses to false sentences
were faster than deceptive responses to true sentences. Response times were similar for
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honesty and deception when responding to a false sentence, but honest-responses were
significantly faster than deceptive-responses when responding to a true sentence. This
response pattern is similar to that observed in Linguistic-Expectancy, such that the largest
difference between honest and deceptive responses is observed in true sentences.
Effect of cognitive-failures on reading time
The ID analysis of response times revealed that CFQ did not drastically alter the
results of the ANOVA conducted on reading times, but it did explain how cognitive
failures influenced the interactive relationship between truth-value and schema. The
individual differences analysis revealed that CFQ did not overtly predict reading time of
any individual condition, but it did predict the relationship between reading time of true
and false sentences when participants held a deceptive schema. As depicted in Figure 3.7,
CFQ did not predict reading time for honest-schemas. However, under a deceptive
schema, lower rates of cognitive failures predicted shorter reading times for true
sentences than false sentences, but this pattern reversed as rate of cognitive-failures
increased, such that higher rates of cognitive failures predicted shorter reading times for
false sentences relative to true sentences.
Effect of cognitive-failures on response time
The main interpretations to take away from this analysis are: 1) Effects of truthvalue were predominantly observable only at lower rates of cognitive failures, and 2)
effects of schema were far more extensive at higher rates of cognitive failures than at
lower rates of cognitive failures. More specifically, the ANOVA analysis revealed longer
response times for deceptive responses to true sentences than to false sentences and it
also revealed similar response-times between honest and deceptive responses to false
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sentences. The analysis examining rate of cognitive-failures revealed that both of these
effects were only observed at lower rates of cognitive failures, whereas at higher rates of
cognitive-failures, the primary effect was a larger difference between honest and
deceptive responses.
Binding-suppression
The Binding-Suppression Model predicts that when one intends to deceive, all
forms of implicit semantic activation are preemptively suppressed, but it appears that the
accessibility of some forms of semantic information is contingent on the nature of the
deceptive-schema. The null effect of truth-value corroborates the prediction that
deception suppresses preferential access of entrenched concepts, suggesting that the
embedded-cue altered the accessibility of more transient semantic associations that are
relevant to incremental sentence evaluation processes. I argue that in Embedded-Cue,
cloze-probability informed the suppression process of the embedded cue, thus influencing
the time course of initiating suppression of irrelevant task-instructions.
Expectation
Truth-value likely influences the suppression process for the same reason as
cloze-probability does; surprisal. But, truth-value also denotes the end of a sentence, and
signals the reader to determine the truth-value and encode it into a STM buffer. During
this process, any existing bindings between the STM representation and LTM are fully
expunged in order to reduce interference between world-knowledge and effective
deception. This expunging process may be unique to deception. If a true concept is
retrieved, liars must update the true concept into a false one and if a false concept is
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retrieved, liars must update the false concept into a true one. In deception, no concepts
are entrenched. They’re all constructed in the moment for the moment.
Dual task: Goal-monitoring vs. word-recognition
Linguistic-Expectancy involves different cognitive requirements as EmbeddedCue. The former involves an omnipresent perceptual cue and the latter involves a
categorical-cue that required active maintenance and effective encoding into the STM
buffer. Unlike Linguistic-Expectancy and the other studies, participants needed to
conduct some form of maintenance rehearsal in order to maintain the subject-cue, while
simultaneously, they also needed to construct and maintain sentence truth-value in order
to appropriate evaluate and then respond to the probe. Most importantly, these operations
must be conducted in a contingent fashion, such that schema-disambiguation (honesty or
deception) informed the response-generation computation (i.e. agree or disagree). In
Embedded-Cue, the locus of goal-monitoring (i.e. deceptive-signal detection) and
sentence-evaluation converged into shared stimulus-features, increasing the likelihood
that the limited-capacity resources of STM would be overloaded relative to prior studies.
Below, I describe how this disruption effect is captured in the cognitive-failures analysis.
Cognitive failures and deception
I argue that the null effect of cognitive-failure rate on honest-schemas replicates
prior deception research that honesty does not require extensive goal-monitoring as well
as prior cognitive research that cognitive-failure rate does not predict task performance
when goal-monitoring is not necessary (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982).
However, under deceptive-schemas, cognitive-failure rate reversed the effect of truthvalue on reading time. The Binding-Suppression Model predicts deceptive-schemas
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suppress implicit semantic activation. Below, I describe how rate of cognitive failures is
particularly relevant to efficacy of deceptive-schemas in the Embedded-Cue.
First, without implicit semantic activation, all search/retrieval/maintenance
processes require active effort and entrenchment has no facilitative effect. Second, the
rate of cognitive failures was only relevant for Embedded-Cue, so the extra maintenance
requirements relative to the other experiments may explain the role of cognitive-failures.
In Embedded-Cue, sentence-evaluation required active maintenance of the schema-cue,
meaning that participants needed to integrate S-V-O words into a holistic unit, while
simultaneously maintaining the subject-noun and how it relates to the deceptive-signal.
Third, lower rates of cognitive failures predict greater effectiveness in directing retrieval
resources as well maintaining relevant content in the face of interference. In sum, the
Embedded-Cue required participants to conduct two distinct operations in order to
successfully perform this task, and rate of cognitive-failures likely predicted disruptions
in effective goal-monitoring, such that the necessary information was effectively
maintained and appropriately operated on.
Under a deceptive-schema, lower rates of cognitive-failures predicted an
entrenchment benefit (i.e. Reading times: true < false). Unlike true sentences, false
sentences do not reflect world knowledge, meaning that false sentences require less
binding-suppression of LTM than true sentences. If lower rates of cognitive-failures
reduce likelihood of disruptions, then perhaps as cognitive-disruptions become more
likely, sentences that require the greatest amount of cognitive-focus (deceptive-schemas
evaluating true sentences) are most likely to experience delays following a disruption.
The additional requirements of re-engaging binding-suppression in order to properly
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execute a deceptive-schema will delay sentence reading time of true sentences relative to
false sentences.
As rate of cognitive failures increased, the rate of disruptions for explicit memory
search/retrieval likely increased, which required restarting cognitive operations. The
deceptive-signal would likely need to be checked again, which will delay sentenceevaluation. Comparative, a lower rate of cognitive failures improves goal-monitoring
efficacy. It’s important to note that cognitive-failure rate did not predict reading time of
either true sentences or false sentences, and the ANOVA analysis revealed no differences
between true and false sentences. The contribution of cognitive-failure rate is that it
organized the reading time of true and false sentences, with lower rates predicting that
true sentences will be read more quickly than false sentences, which gradually reversed
as cognitive-failure rate increased. In summary, cognitive-failure rate did not change the
outcome of the ANOVA results, but it did suggest that cognitive failure rate altered
sentence evaluation strategies when participants intended to respond deceptively.
Higher rates of cognitive failure predicted slower response times across all
conditions, but they were especially predictive of response time differences for deceptiveresponses to false sentences. I argue that lower rates of cognitive failures were associated
with greater efficacy at maintaining content that was relevant for task-performance (i.e.
the embedded cue and the truth-value), as evidenced by the constant positive relationship
between cognitive-failure rate and response time. Lower rates of cognitive-failures
predicted faster deceptive-responses to false sentences than to true sentences because
false sentences required less binding-suppression than true sentences. In order to
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deceptively respond to a true sentence, LTM binding must be suppressed, and failure to
do so necessarily increases the response-time floor carrying out a deceptive-schema.
Automaticity vs controlled processes
This finding coheres with the long-held theory that entrenchment increases the
likelihood that motor plans will activate automatically following stimulus-processing
with little explicit effort necessary (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Norman & Shallice, 1986;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). In situations where these implicit plans must be inhibited,
there is a limitation to the degree to which the prepotent response can be prevented from
informing current responses (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). Entrenched
concepts are necessarily more resistant to change than novel concepts, therefore, when
one chooses to lie regarding an entrenched concept, the liar will need to actively suppress
the prepotent response to a greater extent than when one chooses to lie about a novel
concept.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Binding-suppression and information schema
There are four overall patterns that are consistent across all three studies: First,
honest schemas elicited similar reading and response patterns as would be expected by
the psycholinguistic literature (Morris, 2006; Almor & Sloman, 2000). Second, following
the adoption of a deceptive-schema, sentence-evaluation processes were not informed by
LTM structures. Third, deceptive-schemas tend to encounter slightly greater interference
when the lie-response refers to an entrenched concept instead of a novel concept. Fourth,
honest schemas elicited consistently faster reading times than deceptive-schemas, but
honest-responses were only consistently faster than deceptive-responses when referring
to a true sentence. Taken together, it appears that the single greatest predictor of
deception detection was the degree of cognitive-load that was induced under honestschemas, because in comparison to honest-schemas, there was very little effect of the
manipulations on deceptive behaviors.
The results of this dissertation suggest that binding-suppression involves two
stages: 1) Construct a STM buffer that is quarantined from LTM concepts and 2) ensure
that quarantine is maintained until such time as the buffer is no longer necessary for the
task at hand. Given that binding-suppression relies on a mechanism capable of
maintaining STM representations that contradict world-knowledge, it is necessary to
propose the nature a storage unit. As of now, the theorized cognitive component most
relevant to this component is the episodic buffer from Baddeley & Hitch’s Model of

96

Working Memory (Baddeley, 2000). By encoding into this transient storage unit, STM
can be quarantined away the LTM-concepts from which its representation came from.
Interference theory: Entrenchment facilitates honesty and impairs deception
Since its inception, the memory literature has reliably observed that introducing
novel information into entrenched memory structures creates interference because that
newly revised memory structure now contains incongruent associations (McGeoch &
Irion, 1952; Anderson, 2003). I propose that interference theory cogently explains why
entrenched-concepts facilitated honest responses but interfered with deceptive-responses.
Deeply entrenched concepts are sufficiently rooted into LTM structures that other
concepts within LTM are contingent on their validity (Shipley, 1993). If the concept
Chickens lay eggs were evaluated as false, and then encoded back into LTM, that could
have far-reaching effects, undermining concepts related to chickens, birds, and eggs.
Comparatively, Chickens guard rocks has little relation to LTM knowledge structures.
Entrenched concepts require comparatively more binding-suppression, which is
necessary to prevent: 1) LTM from redirecting the deceptive-schema back to the truth
and 2) ensuring that LTM remains stable and coherent after deception is successfully
executed. In summary, it appears that the latent capacity for a stimulus to trigger
spreading-activation may be directly related to the degree of binding-suppression
required to deceptively respond to it.
Binding-suppression is necessary to quarantine STM representations from the
LTM structures. If binding-suppression were prematurely released, then semanticmemory could seep into the deceptive-schema, introducing interference into the STM
representations and/or the organizational structure of semantic-memory. Based on the
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attentional literature, the longer one is required to maintain a rigid mental state, the more
likely it is for attention to wax and wane, and cause the mental set to briefly fail. If
binding-suppression fails, then semantic memory may interact and thusly interfere with
the deceptive-schema. In the next section, I discuss how cognitive-failure rate speaks to
this transient effort to maintain binding-suppression.
Individual differences
The CFQ is not linked to standard capacity measures of cognitive functioning,
such as visual/verbal working memory, conceptual short term memory, delayed recall
(Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), response-conflict via Stroop, focused
attention via dichotic listening, or visual search via the embedded figures task (Martin,
1983), nor has it been linked to intrusions from either misinformation (Jaschinski &
Wentura, 2002) or salient distractors (Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008).
The CFQ has been linked to response-distractor inhibition (Friedman & Miyake,
2004), as evidenced by correlations between the CFQ and tasks which require active
suppression of distracting/irrelevant information from activating response processes
(Groome & Grant, 2005; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). One reason for the null relationships
between the CFQ and inhibitory tasks such as the Stroop is that the CFQ has been linked
to cognitive dissociation, which reflects one’s predisposition to self-disrupt ongoing
cognitive processes with no external cause (Bruce, Ray, & Carlson, 2007).
Possible explanations for this self-disruption is that CFQ may reflect one’s
capacity to reliably monitor their behavior, ensuring their actions are directed towards
accomplishing top-down goals (Garavan, Hester, Murphy, Fassbender, & Kelly, 2006), as
evidenced by the positive correlation between CFQ score and involuntary intrusion of
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thoughts that are unrelated to the task at hand (Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007; Smallwood, et
al., 2004). In order to effectively deceive, binding-suppression must be restored and the
conflicting information removed.
Regardless of the cause, it is evident that the CFQ measures one’s capacity to
maintain a consistent link between cognitive processes and the external environment so
as to elicit behaviors that successfully accomplish top-down goals (Bridger, Johnsen, &
Brasher, 2013). Due to the unpredictable nature of when/why cognitive failures manifest
themselves and disrupt ongoing cognitive processes, the CFQ predicts performance
specifically when participants need to maintain an active control over their thoughts over
a period of time (Steinborn, Langner, Flehmig, & Huestegge, 2016). Tasks such as the
Stroop and the Hayling examine response-inhibition in a more immediate fashion, with
minimal requirements to maintain suppression over a period of time.
Sentence-evaluation involves the incremental integration of each word into the
preceding context. This incrementally constructed proposition is encoded into STM and
evaluated against organized concepts within LTM. Under an honest-schema, the distance
between the proposition and LTM concepts predicts the processing requirements of
sentence-evaluation, as evidenced by the effect of linguistic certainty and conceptual
entrenchment. Deceptive-schemas are not influenced by these factors.
Successful inhibition of semantic memory during deception likely elicits two vital
effects: 1) Prevents knowledge structures from interfering with the construction and
deployment of a deceptive response and 2) protects the integrity of knowledge structures
by quarantining the lie from semantic memory, ensuring that it is not encoded during
reconsolidation. By inhibiting semantic association, the lie can be created and
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quarantined to this unique context without fear of it generalizing to general knowledge.
Failure to engage this inhibitory control may be relevant to the phenomenon known as
malingering, which refers to the decision to engage in a long-term deception, such as a
medical diagnosis, for some form of social benefit (Merckelbach & Merten, 2012).
Over time, the content of one’s deceptions can infect autobiographical memory,
as individuals begin to alter their memories in order to accommodate the content of the
lies (Festinger, 1962). Neuroimaging evidence supports this argument as brain activity of
malingering patients reflects a population distribution, which ranges from those who
resemble deceptive participants to those who resemble honest participants (Langleben,
Dattilio, & Guthei, 2006). Perhaps binding-suppression requires active intentionality not
only to ensure effective deception, but also to protect the integrity of the liar’s personal
memories intact. Over, binding-suppression may erode, and the deceptive-schema may
become erroneously encoded into LTM. If so, then the Binding-Suppression Model
predicts that the degree to which a deceptive response can be consciously constructed on
the basis of top-down goals correlates with the subsequent integrity of knowledge
structures after successful deployment of the lie.
Alternative explanations
It is possible that maintaining a deceptive schema necessarily shifts attentional
processes into an exhaustive search instead of a self-terminating search. It has long been
suggested that lexical access is exhaustive when the stimulus corresponds to a
nonexistent concept (Forster & Bednall, 1976). Given that false sentences elicited similar
response times across honesty and deception, and deceptive responses were much more
similar across true and false sentences than those sentences types were in honesty, it is
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possible that when one intends to be deceptive, they necessarily elicit exhaustive searches
regardless of whether they activated a meaning at an earlier point. If so, then the fact that
deceptive responses were more delayed to true sentences than honest responses could be
due to a difference in search termination criteria instead of anything to do with the
suppression of LTM associations.
Another possibility that deceptive schemas are particularly taxing on the
phonological loop. Prior research has showed that phonological suppression impairs taskperformance that require goal-monitoring, regardless of the cognitive-load induced by
task-demands (Saeki & Saito, 2004). Phonological resources are necessary in order to
ensure all behaviors are goal-driven instead of stimulus-driven (Miyake, Emerson,
Padilla, & Ahn, 2004) especially when that goal requires preventing habitual responding
from influencing response selection (Saeki, Baddeley, Hitch, & Saito, 2013). If
deceptive-schemas deplete phonological resources, then these findings can be explained
by limited-capacity theories of STM. With phonological resources being directed to
organize all behavior in a goal-oriented fashion, the role of stimulus-based effects will be
minimized, and overall effort required to read and respond will also be increased.
Study limitations
Clinical implications
The current results suggest that honesty and deception differ in terms of what
constitutes “cognitive-load.” Therefore, I argue that instead of trying to induce cognitiveload on liars, clinicians may be more successful in detecting deception may by
minimizing cognitive-load as much as possible. Such a procedure will then allow honestschemas to proceed unencumbered whereas deceptive-schemas will still exhibit the

101

cognitive-load brought on by deception. Because we know that deception is already
difficult, introducing any cognitive-load onto honest-schemas may be counter-productive.
If the field decides examine cognitive-effort as being an indicator of deception, then the
environment should be controlled as much as possible in order to minimize the possibility
that honesty will exhibit signs of cognitive-load. Then, when a suspect indicated signs of
cognitive-load, the protocol will have heavily reduced the possibility that an honestschema is eliciting those signatures. Therefore, I argue that minimizing cognitive-load
will enhance the differences in cognitive-effort between honesty and deception.
Future directions
Specifics of binding-suppression
I’ve proposed that human cognition can construct a STM-buffer capable of
maintaining representations which contradict LTM concepts. The buffer is quarantined
from the LTM concepts from which the representations were based. Currently, the nature
of this quarantine is unspecified, as the current data provide no predictions regarding how
the cognitive system restores LTM bindings upon executing a deceptive-response. I
propose a follow-up study that replicates the majority of methods from Embedded-Cue,
but introduces a task-switching component: schema x subject x truth-value.
Schema-Switch:
Knowledge:switch

Honesty-Repeat
Deception-Repeat
Subject-Repeat
Truth-value- Repeat

Honesty-Switch
Deception-Switch
Subject-Switch
Truth-value- Switch

After having suppressed bindings related to Chickens, how accessible are those bindings
if participants had to immediately deceive about them again vs. if they had to
immediately respond honestly to those same bindings. If deceptive-schemas literally do
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suppress specifically the LTM concepts necessary for the deceptive-response, then there
should be a particularly large switch-cost when participants are required to switch from
deception to honesty on the same concept. Contrarily, there will be probably be a benefit
when participants switch honesty to deception with the same category, as it is already
within STM, thus binding-suppression can be more rapidly initiated.
Relation of deception and working memory models
In order to determine if deception shares capacity-limited resources with
phonological representations, I plan to manipulate the phonological demands of the
sentences (e.g. 3 words vs. 5 words | true vs. false sentences). By separating the subject,
which signals response-intention, from the object, which signals truth-value following
integration with preceding context, I can examine the role of phonological demands on
the act of monitoring for deception vs. the act of deception itself.
If phonological demands elicit a main effect on reading time, that suggests that
goal-monitoring for deception is dependent phonological resources, regardless of whether
or not one eventually decides to deceive. If phonological demands interact with intention,
such that deception incurs a larger cost than honesty during high phonological demands,
then that suggests the preparation to deceive requires phonological resources. Finally, if
truth-value interacts with these effects, that will inform how deceptive schemas alter the
process of chunking distinct phonological representations into a single meaningful chunk.
Self-paced reading task
In order to better understand the incremental process of binding-suppression, I
propose that Embedded-Cue study be replicated with a self-paced reading task. If
binding-suppression nullifies LTM from the outset, there should be a diminished effect of
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cloze-probability both at the verb and at the noun. However, if binding is only suppressed
at final integration processes, then cloze-probability should influence verb reading times.
Effort required to maintain episodic buffer
In order to determine if deception requires an active suppression of LTM bindings
from the STM truth-value, I plan to examine if the duration of the delay between sentence
and probe will influence response time. If an active suppression is required in order to
deceive, then lengthening the delay should increase the effort required to maintain
binding-suppression of the STM buffer, lengthening response times and increasing errors.
Conclusion
The present studies reveal that within the confines of a deception paradigm, the
manifestations of honest behavior replicate basic cognitive psychology findings relating
to incremental adjustments of linguistic certainty during sentence processing (Frank,
2013) as well as the role of entrenched concepts in declarative knowledge during
sentence binding and explicit truth-value evaluation (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974).
Linguistic certainty reduces the amount of processing time required to understand and
evaluate a sentence, but following the binding of a sentence into a holistic unit of
meaning, the semantic representation of a sentence is more relevant than the specific
lexical forms that comprise it (Christiansen & Chater, 2016). However, the adoption of a
deceptive-schema appears to alter basic cognitive processes relating to evaluating
sentences and generating responses in relation to those sentences. Deception appears to
suppress implicit semantic activation during these processes, but the effort of this
suppression is taxing. In order to suppress semantic memory, and construct STM
representation that contradict world-knowledge, the effort involved in deploying a
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deceptive response is related to the strength of the contradicted memory. In summary, I
argue that deception is a cognitive process just like any other, and therefore, it is prone to
behavioral conflict just like any other process (e.g. interference, decay), but it’s possible
that the rules which govern the manifestation of behavioral conflict in honesty may not be
generalizable to behavioral conflict in deception.
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APPENDIX A: LINGUISTIC-EXPECTANCY STIMULI
Subject Category: Humans
Item

Subject

Verb

True

Semantic

Syntactic

False

1

Archers

shoot

arrows

bullets

drugs

sandals

2

Architects

design

houses

closets

weddings

suits

3

Astronomers

study

stars

law

soccer

smiles

4

Attorneys

meet

clients

prisoners

dates

poems

5

Babysitters

watch

toddlers

parents

sunsets

music

6

Barbers

cut

hair

wigs

steak

waves

7

Bartenders

mix

drinks

cakes

speeches

lakes

8

Brokers

pick

stocks

songs

apples

phantoms

9

Caterers

prepare

meals

bacteria

lessons

baths

10

Chefs

cook

pancakes

pears

wax

storms

11

Coaches

train

athletes

soldiers

computers

gates

12

Cowboys

ride

horses

camels

bicycles

peacocks

13

Dancers

perform

waltzes

concerts

karate

journals

14

Doctors

diagnose

patients

strangers

engines

meadows

15

Farmers

raise

cows

pests

taxes

roads

16

Gardeners

plant

flowers

weeds

flags

clothes

17

Hunters

track

ducks

termites

expenses

paper

18

Janitors

clean

rooms

shoes

consciences

tape

19

Knights

rescue

princesses

villains

firefighters

aluminum

20

Lifeguards

protect

kids

sharks

cattle

books

21

Mechanics

fix

cars

toys

marriages

daylight

22
23

Novelists
Parents

write
lecture

books
children

music
pilots

laws
audiences

beads
vehicles

24

Plumbers

repair

faucets

trucks

skin

spoons

25

Postmen

deliver

mail

food

babies

oil

26

Runners

carry

liquid

tea

poison

keys

27
28

Sailors
Shepherds

chart
herd

courses
sheep

highways
bison

sales
riots

stoves
motorcycles

29

Students

attend

lectures

funerals

physicians

wicker

30

Teachers

instruct

students

principals

monkeys

cameras

31

Therapists

treat

depression

measles

movies

darkness

123

32

Vampires

drink

blood

soda

bottles

coral

Subject Category: Animals
Item

Subject

Verb

True

Semantic

Syntactic

False

1

Apes

peel

bananas

elephants

paste

lakes

2

Bears

catch

fish

streams

colds

dye

3

Beavers

gnaw

wood

sand

pencils

shrimp

4

Buffalo

5

Cats

roam
chase

plains
mice

deserts
cages

hallways
deserts

wires
moss

6

Cows

produce

milk

honey

art

rays

7

Crows

collect

string

pollen

stamps

cement

8

Dogs

chew

bones

glasses

gum

lemonade

9

Ducks

fly

south

underwater

packages

underground

10

Eagles

build

nests

dams

bridges

carpets

11

Elephants

crave

peanuts

cats

gadgets

pictures

12

Frogs

eat

insects

toads

dust

cliffs

13

Giraffes

nibble

leaves

lions

ears

plaster

14

Goats

scale

mountains

fences

buildings

sleeves

15

Horses

pull

wagons

tractors

all-nighters

clouds

16

Jaguars

stalk

prey

butterflies

actors

radios

17

Koalas

climb

trees

dunes

ladders

staplers

18

Lambs

grow

wool

antlers

wheat

walls

19
20

Lions
Mules

maul
munch

villagers
hay

spears
saddles

furniture
losses

alarms
helmets

21

Nightingales

serenade

mates

hatchlings

crowds

banks

22

Oxen

plow

fields

grass

snow

eagles

23

Porcupines

shoot

quills

fur

guns

watches

24

Pythons

strangle

rodents

whales

economies

socks

25

Raccoons

steal

trash

pinecones

cable

haircuts

26

Rats

spread

germs

toys

rumors

reefs

27

Squids

squirt

ink

water

jelly

sneakers

28

Squirrels

hoard

nuts

marbles

profits

beds

29

Tigers

prowl

grasslands

swamps

nightclubs

blueprints

30

Turkeys

lay

eggs

straw

bricks

clocks

31

Weasels

dig

holes

ditches

basements

wind

32

Whales

breathe

air

bubbles

words

scales
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APPENDIX B: REVISED STIMULI FOR SEMANTIC-RELATEDNESS
Subject Category: Humans
Item

Subject

Verb

TRUE

Semantic

Syntactic

FALSE

1

Archers

shoot

arrows

bullets

drugs

sandals

2

Architects

design

houses

rulers

weddings

suits

3

Astronomers

study

stars

law

soccer

smiles

4

Attorneys

meet

clients

bailiffs

dates

poems

5

Babysitters

watch

toddlers

parents

sunsets

music

6

Barbers

cut

hair

wigs

steak

waves

7

Bartenders

mix

drinks

cakes

speeches

lakes

8

Brokers

pick

stocks

movies

apples

phantoms

9

Caterers

prepare

meals

bacteria

lessons

baths

10

Chefs

cook

pancakes

pears

wax

storms

11

Coaches

guide

athletes

soldiers

boats

gates

12

Cowboys

ride

horses

camels

bicycles

peacocks

13

Dancers

perform

waltzes

plays

karate

journals

14

Doctors

diagnose

patients

thermometers

engines

meadows

15

Farmers

raise

cows

pests

taxes

roads

16

Gardeners

plant

flowers

weeds

flags

clothes

17

Hunters

track

ducks

termites

expenses

paper

18

Janitors

clean

rooms

shoes

consciences

tape

19

Knights

rescue

princesses

villains

firefighters

aluminum

20

Lifeguards

protect

kids

sharks

cattle

books

21

Mechanics

fix

cars

toys

marriages

daylight

22

Novelists

write

books

music

laws

beads

23

Parents

lecture

children

pilots

audiences

vehicles

24

Plumbers

repair

faucets

trucks

skin

spoons

25

Postmen

deliver

mail

food

babies

oil

26

Runners

wear

shoes

helmets

perfume

boxes

27

Sailors

chart

voyages

highways

stocks

stoves

28

Shepherds

herd

sheep

bison

riots

motorcycles

29

Geographers

map

land

compasses

equations

paint

30

Teachers

instruct

students

principals

monkeys

cameras

31

Therapists

treat

depression

couches

dramas

darkness
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32

Vampires

drink

blood

soda

bottles

coral

Subject Category: Animals
Item

Subject

Verb

True

Semantic

Syntactic

FALSE

1

Apes

peel

bananas

elephants

paste

lakes

2

Bears

catch

fish

streams

colds

dye

3

Beavers

gnaw

wood

sand

pencils

shrimp

4

Buffalo

roam

plains

deserts

hallways

wires

5

Cats

chase

mice

cages

deserts

moss

6

Cows

produce

milk

honey

art

rays

7

Crows

collect

twigs

pollen

stamps

cement

8

Dogs

chew

bones

glasses

gum

lemonade

9

Ducks

fly

south

underwater

packages

underground

10

Eagles

build

nests

dams

bridges

carpets

11

Elephants

crave

peanuts

cats

gadgets

pictures

12

Frogs

eat

insects

toads

dust

cliffs

13

Giraffes

nibble

leaves

lions

ears

plaster

14

Goats

scale

mountains

fences

buildings

sleeves

15

Horses

pull

wagons

tractors

all-nighters

clouds

16

Jaguars

stalk

prey

butterflies

actors

radios

17

Koalas

climb

trees

dunes

ladders

staplers

18

Lambs

grow

wool

antlers

wheat

walls

19

Lions

maul

zebras

spears

furniture

alarms

20

Mules

munch

hay

boots

losses

helmets

21

Nightingales

serenade

mates

branches

crowds

banks

22

Oxen

plow

fields

trees

snow

eagles

23

Porcupines

shoot

quills

fur

guns

watches

24

Pythons

strangle

rodents

whales

economies

socks

25

Raccoons

steal

trash

pinecones

cable

haircuts

26

Rats

spread

germs

toys

rumors

reefs

27

Squids

squirt

ink

water

jelly

sneakers

28

Squirrels

hoard

nuts

marbles

profits

beds

29

Tigers

prowl

grasslands

swamps

nightclubs

blueprints

30

Turkeys

lay

eggs

straw

bricks

clocks

31

Weasels

dig

holes

birds

basements

wind

32

Whales

breathe

air

bubbles

words

scales
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APPENDIX C: STIMULI FOR LINGUISTIC-EXPECTANCY
Item

Subject

Verb

Object

Cloze-Probability
Animals

low

Truth-Value

high

True

False

1

Apes

grasp

peel

bananas

peanuts

2

Beavers

gnaw

chomp

wood

sand

3

Bees

visit

pollinate

flowers

graves

4

Birds

travel

migrate

south

underwater

5

Cats

scare

chase

mice

bears

6

Chickens

guard

lay

eggs

rocks

7

Cows

contain

produce

milk

honey

8

Dogs

retrieve

bury

bones

chairs

9

Dolphins

inhale

breathe

air

dust

10

Eagles

repair

build

nests

dams

11

Frogs

follow

catch

flies

birds

12

Monkeys

ascend

climb

trees

dirt

13

Oxen

work

plow

fields

caves

14

Possums

appear

play

dead

clean

15

Raccoons

disturb

scavenge

garbage

gasoline

16

Rats

cause

spread

disease

medicine

17

Seals

seek

eat

fish

mice

18

Snakes

watch

eat

mice

whales

19

Ticks

need

suck

blood

bones

20

Tigers

prowl

rule

jungles

deserts

Item

Subject

Humans

Verb

Object

Cloze-Probability

Truth-Value

low

high

True

False

1

Archers

prepare

shoot

arrows

bullets

2

Architects

sketch

design

buildings

mountains

3

Astronomers

record

study

stars

law

4

Babies

need

drink

milk

soda

5

Bakers

mix

roll

dough

mud

6

Brokers

buy

pick

stocks

movies
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7

Butchers

utilize

sharpen

knives

arrows

8

Cowboys

own

ride

horses

elephants

9

Farmers

raise

milk

cows

bugs

10

Gardeners

fertilize

water

plants

snow

11

Janitors

clean

mop

floors

lawns

12

Lifeguards

safeguard

protect

swimmers

sharks

13

Mailmen

manage

deliver

mail

houses

14

Mechanics

repair

fix

cars

gloves

15

Novelists

create

write

books

music

16

Parents

carry

discipline

children

doctors

17

Pirates

own

bury

treasure

aircraft

18

Sailors

operate

steer

ships

planes

19

Shepherds

buy

herd

sheep

wolves

20

Tailors

alter

sew

clothes

pictures
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APPENDIX D: STIMULI FOR EMBEDDED-CUE
Item

Subject

Verb

Object

Cloze-Probability

Truth-Value

Animals

low

high

True

False

1

Beavers

gnaw

chomp

wood

sand

2

Bees

visit

pollinate

flowers

graves

3

Birds

travel

migrate

south

underwater

4

Cats

scare

chase

mice

bears

5

Chickens

guard

lay

eggs

rocks

6

Cows

contain

produce

milk

honey

7

Dogs

retrieve

bury

bones

chairs

8

Eagles

repair

build

nests

dams

9

Frogs

follow

catch

flies

birds

10

Monkeys

ascend

climb

trees

dirt

11

Raccoons

disturb

scavenge

garbage

gasoline

12

Rats

cause

spread

disease

medicine

13

Seals

seek

eat

fish

mice

14

Snakes

watch

eat

mice

whales

15

Ticks

need

suck

blood

bones

16

Tigers

prowl

rule

jungles

deserts

Item

Subject

1

Verb

Object

Cloze-Probability

Truth-Value

Humans

low

high

True

False

Archers

prepare

shoot

arrows

bullets

2

Architects

sketch

design

buildings

mountains

3

Astronomers

record

study

stars

law

4

Babies

need

drink

milk

soda

5

Bakers

mix

roll

dough

mud

6

Brokers

buy

pick

stocks

movies

7

Butchers

utilize

sharpen

knives

arrows

8

Gardeners

fertilize

water

plants

snow

9

Janitors

clean

mop

floors

lawns

10

Mailmen

manage

deliver

mail

houses
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11

Mechanics

repair

fix

cars

gloves

12

Novelists

create

write

books

music

13

Parents

carry

discipline

children

doctors

14

Pirates

own

bury

treasure

aircraft

15

Sailors

operate

steer

ships

planes

16

Tailors

alter

sew

clothes

pictures
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